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Abstract: China’s economic expansion into the United States has generated 
intense debates and controversies. Some view it as posing a critical challenge to 
extant U.S. institutions; others see China as a stakeholder of the extant system 
and that the Chinese investors are by and large “playing our game.” However, 
theories and hypotheses on the subject abounding, little is yet known how 
exactly Chinese investors interact with U.S. institutions and the legal 
implications of such interactions. Relying on the first comprehensive survey of 
Chinese companies investing in the United States, this Article fills the gap with 
an interdisciplinary study of the adaptation of Chinese investors to the U.S. legal 
and regulatory systems. Under a novel analytic frame, the study finds evidence 
that Chinese investors are largely commercially driven and adaptive to the host 
country environment. The article further evaluates this general finding with a 
case study, i.e., Chinese companies’ adaptation to U.S. institutions governing 
employment discrimination, and finds confirming evidence. It then moves on to 
the discussion of two often-debated threats from China’s business expansion in 
the United States: the threat to U.S. national security and the threat to free 
market capitalism. The empirical evidence suggests that Chinese investors are 
unlikely to pose major threats to extant U.S. institutions in the near future. In 
light of the findings, policymakers should resist the temptation to hastily erect 
overly protective measures in response to the sharp rise of Chinese investments. 
Regulated properly, Chinese investors may become major stakeholders of the 
U.S. institutions and contribute to their long-term resilience. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) into the 
United States and its legal implications from an interdisciplinary 
perspective, with data from the first comprehensive survey of Chinese 
companies investing in the United States. As China has surpassed the 
United States to be the world’s largest economy,1 its business expansion 
abroad has triggered intense debates and many controversies. The optimists 
welcome it as providing much needed capital and knowledge without 
ideological strings attached.2 The pessimists criticize the resource-
orientation of the investments and their disruption to the market, legal, and 
political orders of the host countries.3 
While Chinese business expansion traditionally gravitated towards 
developing countries, the United States has recently emerged as the leading 
national recipient of FDI from China.4 Following this trend, American 
scholars and policymakers are shifting their attention back home. The 
debate about Chinese investment in the United States, however, has so far 
relied mainly on anecdotal reports and case analysis.5 Insightful as some of 
these studies are, a panoramic view of the broad trend remains elusive. 
Moreover, extant studies rarely touch on the systemic and dynamic 
interactions between U.S. law and China’s business expansion.  
Based on the first ever comprehensive survey of Chinese companies 
investing in the United States, this article fills the gaps. It contributes to the 
debate about the implications of Chinese outward investment by exploring a 
few basic but important questions—how Chinese investors perceive U.S. 
business, legal, and political systems, whether they would adapt to this 
foreign environment, and if yes, how? These questions are important 
because Chinese investors readily adapting to U.S. institutions presumably 
pose less of a threat. For instance, the U.S. subsidiary of Haier, a major 
 
 1  Measured in purchasing power parity. China Surpasses U.S. to Become Largest World Economy, 
FOX NEWS (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/12/06/china-surpasses-us-to-become-
largest-world-economy. 
 2  See generally DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN 
AFRICA (2010); Timothy Webster, China’s Human Rights Footprint in Africa, 51 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 626 (2013). 
 3  See generally Barry Sautman & Hairong Yang, African Perspectives on China-African Links, 199 
CHINA Q. 728, 729 n.6 (2009); Denis M. Tull, China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and 
Consequences, 44 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 459 (2006); Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wiig, Better the Devil You 
Know? Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Africa, 12 J. AFR. BUS. 31 (2011). 
 4  See China Global Investment Tracker 2014, AM. ENTER. INST. (last visited Oct. 18, 2015), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map; Derek 
Scissors, A Third Straight Record for Chinese Investment in the U.S., AM. ENTER. INST. (Jan. 12, 2015), 
https://www.aei.org/publication/third-straight-record-chinese-investment-us. 
 5  See, e.g., EDWARD S. STEINFELD, PLAYING OUR GAME: WHY CHINA’S RISE DOESN’T THREATEN 
THE WEST (2010). 
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Chinese appliances manufacturer, may well outperform its American 
competitors, but policymakers should have less to worry if the only 
differences between the two are brand name and improved efficiency and 
customer service. On the other hand, if Chinese investors systematically 
disobey U.S. law and code of business conduct, their growing presence in 
this country will undoubtedly breed conflict and threaten extant U.S. 
institutions. 
This study proposes a novel theoretical frame to analyze the adaptation 
(or lack thereof) of Chinese investors to host country institutions. It then 
examines the data from the survey of Chinese investments in the United 
States and finds preliminary evidence indicating their commercial motives 
such as access to market, advanced technology, and brand enhancement 
(See Figure 8). In addition, the survey findings suggest that Chinese 
investors share a generally positive view of U.S. business, legal, and 
political systems,6 despite recent damage to U.S. soft power. Moreover, the 
study indicates that many Chinese investors, by relying heavily on local 
talent and professionals, readily adapt to extant U.S. institutions.7 This 
general finding is then evaluated and substantiated with an in-depth analysis 
of Chinese investors’ adaptation to U.S. institutions for the prevention of 
employment discrimination. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, the 
article further explores two of the most-debated threats of FDI from China, 
i.e., the threat to U.S. national security and more broadly the threat to free 
market capitalism 
The article will proceed as follows. The next two subsections of Part I 
present a summary description of China’s economic growth and expansion 
abroad over the past few decades and the controversies and debates on the 
impacts. Next, Part II presents the theory for analyzing the adaptation (or 
lack thereof) of Chinese investors and lays the basis for an interdisciplinary 
analysis of their impact on extant U.S. institutions. Part III then describes 
the design and validity of the survey research on Chinese companies 
investing in the United States. Applying the survey results, Part IV probes 
the motivations of Chinese investors, their perceptions of U.S. business, 
legal, and political systems, and their ability to adapt. Part V then evaluates 
the general findings using an in-depth study of Chinese investors’ 
adaptation to U.S. institutions regarding employment discrimination. Part 
VI examines two intensely debated potential threats Chinese business 
expansion poses to the United States, i.e., threats to its national security and 
to the U.S. model of free market capitalism. Last, Part VII briefly discusses 
the contributions of the research, and Part VIII concludes the article. 
 
 
 6  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 7  See infra Parts IV.B.2 and V. 
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 A. Growth of the Chinese Economy and Investment in the United 
States 
Measured in purchasing power parity (PPP), China has surpassed the 
United States as the number one economy in the world.8 After four-decades 
of unprecedented economic growth, China now tops the world ranking in, 
inter alia, international trade,9 energy consumption,10 mobile phone users,11 
automobile sales,12 steel production,13 foreign currency reserves,14 and 
Internet users.15 Even measured at the current exchange rate, China is 
already the world’s second largest economy and, baring natural, political, or 
economic catastrophes of a very large scale, is set to overtake the United 
States in about a decade.16 Yet given the size of the Chinese population and 
its comparatively low level of living standard, the country still holds 
enormous potential to grow.17 Some have even begun to contemplate 
whether and when the Chinese economy would double that of the United 
States.18 
Decades of meteoric growth finally lifted the floodgate for China’s 
outbound investment, which experienced a recent surge (See Figure 1) due 
to a confluence of factors such as large current account surpluses, a huge 
foreign currency reserve,19 growing corporate profits,20 and loosening 
 
 8  Measured in purchasing power parity. FOX NEWS, supra note 1.  
 9  China Eclipses U.S. as Biggest Trading Nation, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 10, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-09/china-passes-u-s-to-become-the-world-s-biggest-trading-
nation.html. 
 10  Spencer Swartz & Shai Oster, China Tops U.S. in Energy Use, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703720504575376712353150310.  
 11  Gao Yuan, Nation Becoming Top Mobile Phone Market, CHINA DAILY (May 30, 2014), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-05/30/content_17552888.htm. 
 12  China Ends U.S.’s Reign as Largest Auto Market, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aE.x_r_l9NZE. 
 13  China Steel Industry Facing Harshest Ever Operating Environment, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 
2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-30/china-steel-industry-facing-harshest-ever-
operating-environment.html. 
 14  China’s Forex Reserve Returns ‘Relatively Good’, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-forex-reserve-returns-relatively-good-1402553350. 
 15  David Barboza, China Surpasses U.S. in Number of Internet Users, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/26/business/worldbusiness/26internet.html?_r=0. 
 16  Malik Singleton, OECD Report Says China’s Economy Will Overtake US Economy By 2016, 
INT. BUS. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/oecd-report-says-chinas-economy-will-
overtake-us-economy-2016-1146333. 
 17  CRAIG K. ELWELL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33604, IS CHINA A THREAT TO THE U.S. 
ECONOMY? 14 (2007). 
 18  Economist: China’s Economy to Double That of US in 20 Years, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Mar. 24, 
2011), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/7330326.html. 
 19  WALL ST. J., supra note 14.  
 20  ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, AN ANALYSIS OF CHINESE 
INVESTMENTS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 5–6 (2012), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/ 
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government regulations.21 Much of Chinese investment outflows 
traditionally took the form of sovereign debt, and Beijing’s vast holding of 
U.S. treasury securities ($1,254.8 billion as of October 201522) has stirred 
up a fair amount of controversies ranging from latent threat to U.S. national 
security to the distortion of the credit market.23  
While dust has yet to settle on the implications of China’s holdings of 
U.S. sovereign securities, scholars and policymakers have shifted their 
attention to the soaring outward direct investment. From a trivial amount of 
$830 million in 1990, Chinese investment abroad reached $101 billion in 
2013 (See Figure 1), making it the world’s third largest source of FDI.24 
Though the outward FDI was at a time concentrated in Africa and other 
developing regions for securing a stable supply of natural resources, more 






 21  Yue-Fang Si, The Development of Outward FDI Regulation and the Internationalization of 
Chinese Firms, 23 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 804, 816–17 (2014). 
 22  Data available at the official website for U.S. Treasury Department. U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., 
MAJOR FOREIGN HOLDERS OF TREASURY SECURITIES (Dec. 15, 2015), http://ticdata.treasury.gov/ 
Publish/mfh.txt.  
 23  For a list of concerns with the implications of the large holdings, see WAYNE M. MORRISON & 
MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34314, CHINA’S HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY 10 (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34314.pdf. For 
the argument of moderate threat, see, for example, Daniel W. Drezner, Bad Debts: Assessing China’s 
Financial Influence in Great Power Politics, INT. SECUR. 7 (2009). For the argument that low-cost 
borrowing from China led to abundant cheap credit in the U.S. market, which encouraged excessive 
debt-financed expansion, led to the real estate bubble, and eventually ignited the global financial crisis, 
see Heleen Mees, How China’s Boom Caused the Financial Crisis, FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/17/how_china_s_boom_caused_the_financial_crisis; 
Neil Irwin, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke Says U.S. Policy Isn’t Causing Global Financial Woes, THE 
WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/ 
02/18/AR2011021807046.html. 
 24  Karl Sauvant, Challenges for China’s Outward FDI, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 31, 2013, 7:10 AM), 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-10/31/content_17070440.htm. 
 25  Andreas Klossek et al, Chinese Enterprises in Germany: Establishment Modes and Strategies to 
Mitigate the Liability of Foreignness, 47 J. WORLD BUS. 35, 35 (2012). 
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Figure 1: China’s Total FDI Outflow (1990–2013; million U.S. 
dollars) 
Data source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014, Annex table 02 - FDI 
outflows, by region and economy, 1990–2013. 
 
In line with this general trend, Chinese investment in the United States 
has recently exceeded U.S. investment in China, reversing for the first time 
in the past three decades the direction of net capital flows between the 
world’s two largest economies.26 Historically, a backwater for FDI from 
China,27 the United States holds irresistible charm to Chinese investors, as 
evidenced by a recent Economist Intelligence Unit report ranking it number 
one among more than 200 countries in terms of attractiveness to Chinese 
FDI.28 True to this prediction, the United States has emerged as the biggest 
national recipient of investments from China29 after a few years of 
explosive growth (See Figure 2). 
  
 
 26  Toh Han Shih, China’s Surging Investment in US Heralds New Multinational Era, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1565759/chinas-
surging-investment-us-heralds-new-multinational-era.  
 27  China did not even enter the list of top ten investor countries, measured by the 2010–2012 
average. See U.S. DEP’T OF COM., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (Oct. 2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2013fdi_report_-_final_for_web.pdf.  
 28  China Going Global Investment Index, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (2013), 
http://china.ucsd.edu/_files/odi-2013/09232013_Paper_Liu_ChinaGoingGlobal.pdf. 
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Figure 2: China’s Outbound FDI in the United States (2002–2013; million 
U.S. dollars) 
Data source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 
 B. Diverging Views on Chinese Business Globalization 
Given its significant implications, the dramatic Chinese business 
expansion abroad has caught close attention of scholars and policymakers 
worldwide, who have expressed two diverging views: one welcoming the 
expansion as broadly beneficial and the other dismissing it as a critical 
threat. Those in the former camp observe an ascending China opting to 
“play our game.”30 Enabled partially by embracing Western institutions,31 
the Chinese business expansion will fortify the established system and 
benefit the United States in the long run.32 Also, the existing global order is 
sufficiently open and inclusive to accommodate a rising superpower 
without necessarily experiencing any major disruptions. In addition, China 
is distinguishable from previous emerging powers in the large stake it holds 
in maintaining the extant global order.33 More concretely, Chinese direct 
 
 30  EDWARD S. STEINFELD, PLAYING OUR GAME: WHY CHINA’S RISE DOESN’T THREATEN THE 
WEST 265 (2010). 
 31  Id. 
 32  Aaron L. Friedberg, The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?, INT. SECUR. 1, 
12–14 (2005). 
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investment in the United States will bring immediate benefits such as new 
jobs and additional research and development.34 
Somewhat ironically, a few reach the same optimistic view by 
trivializing the ability of Chinese multinational corporations to compete 
with U.S. companies as Chinese entrepreneurs tend to focus on making 
short-term gains, diversifying business, and cultivating good government 
relationships.35 Moreover, seemingly “profitable” Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) rely heavily on various government subsidies and/or 
their politically-secured oligopolistic positions in the Chinese market.36 To 
these commentators the current concern with the Chinese business 
expansion is little more than déjà vu.37 Despite the fear of and the prediction 
about a rising Japan replacing the United States as the world’s economic 
hegemon in the 1980s,38 the U.S. system eventually proved more resilient 
and competitive.39 
Another group holding the non-threat view, consisting mostly of 
business scholars, sees Chinese investors’ global expansion track closely 
conventional patterns of cross-border investment. Its net effect on the host 
country is a function of multiple factors such as investment motives and the 
development gap between the host and the home states.40 Companies from 
developed countries, for instance, tend to transplant their corporate 
governance and management style to their overseas operations. By 
comparison, investors from developing countries, unable to rely on home-
developed efficiency measures or technics, are more inclined to adapt to the 
host state environment.41 
On the other side of the debate are those perceiving the Chinese 
economic expansion abroad as a critical threat.42 Some in this camp are 
 
(2008). 
 34  See generally THEODORE MORAN & LINDSAY OLDENSKI, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES: BENEFITS, SUSPICIONS, AND RISKS WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO FDI FROM CHINA 
(2013). 
 35  See George J. Gilboy, The Myth Behind China’s Miracle, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 33, 42 (2004). 
 36  UNIRULE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, THE NATURE, PERFORMANCE, AND REFORM OF THE STATE-
OWNED ENTERPRISES 34 (APR. 12, 2011), http://www.unirule.org.cn/xiazai/2011/20110412.pdf.  
 37  Curtis J. Milhapt, Chinese Investment: A Case of Déjà Vu for the United States, 4 E. ASIAN F. Q. 
1, 34 (2012). 
 38  The most famous work is probably by PAUL M. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT 
POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1989). 
 39  Sean Starrs, American Economic Power Hasn’t Declined? It Globalized! Summoning the Data 
and Taking Globalization Seriously, 57 INT. STUD. Q. 817, 827 (2013). 
 40  See Randall Morck et al., Perspectives on China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 39 J. INT. 
BUS. STUD. 337, 348 (2008). 
 41  Xiaohua Yang et al., A Comparative Analysis of the Internationalization of Chinese and 
Japanese Firms, 26 ASIA PAC. J. OF MGMT. 141, 156 (2009). 
 42  For a summary of the pessimistic views, see Aaron L. Friedberg, The Future of U.S.-China 
Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?, 30 INT. SECUR. 1, 17–22 (2005). 
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concerned with the practical risks of Chinese outbound investment, 
especially in developing countries. Chinese companies investing in Africa, 
for instance, have allegedly spawned corruption, disrespect of law and 
human rights violations, and have on occasion even supported ruthless 
dictators.43 Even Chinese officials lamented that the outbound investors 
might be “exporting China’s domestic problems.”44 The threat may persist 
as Chinese companies show a tendency to invest in resource-rich countries 
with weak institutions45 and have a tolerance for high political risk.46 
To some naysayers, the critical threat originates from China’s practice 
of state capitalism.47 Supported by a highly interventionist government with 
vast resources, Chinese SOEs pose a formidable challenge to free market 
capitalism.48 And such challenge may not come only from the SOEs as 
private Chinese companies, once recognized as national champions, will be 
co-opted and receive the state’s largess.49 Given the resources controlled by 
the Chinese government, its “corporate agents” pose at least a short or 
medium-term threat to Western firms in the global market.50 
Other opponents take notice of the Chinese government’s discontent 
with the extant international system shaped and gingerly guarded by the 
United States and its allies. To have more voice in global political and 
economic affairs, China has undertaken initiatives to build alternative 
multilateral institutions. It recently coordinated and sponsored the 
establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank, viewed by some as 
the developing country alternative of the Bretton Woods institutions for 
financing global development.51 China has also proposed to create the Asian 
 
 43  For a brief summary of the negative media coverage of China-African links, see Barry Sautman 
& Hairong Yang, African Perspectives on China-African Links, 199 CHINA Q. 728, 729 n.6 (2009); 
Denis M. Tull, China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences, 44 J. OF MODERN 
AFR. STUD. 459 (2006); Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wiig, Better the Devil You Know? Chinese Foreign Direct 
Investment in Africa, 12 J. AFR. BUS. 31 (2011). 
 44  Zhongguo Qiye “Zouchuqu” Yao Tupo “Xingxiang Kunju” (中国企业 
“走出去”要突破”形象困局”) [Chinese Companies Going Abroad Should Change Image], LIAOWANG 
(瞭望) (Oct. 2, 2012), http://finance.chinanews.com/cj/2012/10-22/4265426.shtml. 
 45  E.g., Bala Ramasamy et al., China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment: Location Choice and 
Firm Ownership, 47 J. WORLD BUS. 17, 20, 23 (2012); Peter J. Buckley et al., The Determinants of 
Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 38 J. INT. BUS. STUD. 499, 506, 510 (2007). 
 46  Diego Quer et al., Political Risk, Cultural Distance, and Outward Foreign Direct Investment: 
Empirical Evidence from Large Chinese Firms, 29 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 1089, 1092 (2012). 
 47  The Rise of State Capitalism, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21543160. 
 48  See generally Ian Bremmer, State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?, 88 
FOREIGN AFF. 40 (2009). 
 49  Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese 
Firm, 103 GEO. L. J. 665, 688–700 (2015). 
 50  The Rise of State Capitalism, supra note 47. 
 51  Raj M. Desai & James Raymond Vreeland, What the New Bank of BRICS Is All About, WASH. 
POST: MONKEY CAGE (July 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
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Infrastructure Investment Bank,52 a regional multilateral institution to boost 
China’s influence and to overshadow the Asian Development Bank 
dominated by the United States and Japan.53 And soon after the global 
financial crisis, China put forward a plan to replace the U.S. dollar as the 
world reserve currency with special drawing rights based on a bundle of 
currencies.54 Moreover, China inaugurated the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, an international body aimed at creating and expanding 
military cooperation among the regional powers.55 Some are alarmed by its 
potential to undermine democracy in the member states.56 In sum, the 
pessimists raise a red warning sign stating that the ascent of China, if not 
properly managed by the West, will mark the global turn heralding “a dark 
era of ideological contention and geopolitical rivalry.”57 
To summarize thus far, the burgeoning literature on the ramifications 
of China’s global expansion reflects diverging views. The insights 
generated from the debate, however, are inadequate to answer some of the 
most pressing questions about the impacts of soaring Chinese FDI on U.S. 
business, legal, and political systems. As noted earlier, one major 
shortcoming of the literatures is methodological, as many have relied on 
investigating a small number of Chinese companies.58 While ethnographic 
studies can present valuable details and contexts about Chinese FDI in the 
United States, the induced theories tend to be limited in application. Though 
a few recent studies used survey and other quantitative methods,59 the 
 
cage/wp/2014/07/17/what-the-new-bank-of-brics-is-all-about/. 
 52  Jane Perlez, U.S. Opposing China’s Answer to World Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2014, at A1, 
A10. 
 53  Peng Lam, China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: East Asian Responses, 6 E. ASIAN 
POLICY 127 (2014). 
 54  Jamil Anderlini, China Calls for New Reserve Currency, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7851925a-17a2-11de-8c9d-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3DcTbEkqs. 
 55  E.g., Jing-Dong Yuan, China’s Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 855, 856 (2010); Pax Sinica: China is Trying to Build a 
New World Order, Starting in Asia, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2014, at 39. 
 56  Thomas Ambrosio, Catching the ‘Shanghai Spirit’: How the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia, 60 EUR.-ASIA STUDIES 1321, 1322 
(2008). 
 57  CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, NO ONE’S WORLD: THE WEST, THE RISING REST, AND THE COMING 
GLOBAL TURN 205 (2012). 
 58  See, e.g., STEINFELD, supra note 5, at 176; Yang et al., supra note 41, at 147 (using just two 
institutions); Ping Deng, Why do Chinese Firms Tend to Acquire Strategic Assets in International 
Expansion? 44 J. WORLD BUS. 74, 79 (2009) (using just three institutions); Huaichuan Rui & George S. 
Yip, Foreign Acquisitions by Chinese Firms: A Strategic Intent Perspective, 43 J. WORLD BUS. 213, 218 
(2008) (using just three institutions). 
 59  For instance, a critical literature review of all articles on the internationalization of Chinese firms 
published in major scholarly journals found thirteen studies that used a survey method. Ping Deng, The 
Internationalization of Chinese Firms: A Critical Review and Future Research, 14 INT’L J. MGMT. 
REVS. 408, 410 (2012). 
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government-reported macro-level data they relied on to investigate Chinese 
outbound investment were often biased and misleading.60 As a result, and 
given that soaring FDI inflows from China are a relatively new 
phenomenon,61 we are still in the dark as to why Chinese investors choose 
the United States, how they interact with U.S. institutions, and whether they 
will constitute a critical threat.  
Another drawback of the literatures is their relatively narrow scope. As 
most of the studies on Chinese outward investment were led by business 
scholars and social scientists, the questions they have investigated rarely 
touch on the dynamic interactions between the investors and the U.S. legal 
and regulatory systems. Yet in contrast to most developing countries, 
formal rules in the United States should play an essential role in shaping the 
behavior of Chinese investors. Having neglected the legal dimension, the 
literatures leave huge gaps.62  
In sum, fast ascending the international pecking order economically 
and politically, China and its global business expansion have attracted 
enormous scholarly interest. Yet previous studies about the effects of 
Chinese outward investment have left important questions under-explored. 
Taking an interdisciplinary approach, this Article fills the gaps by 
empirically investigating the adaptation (or lack thereof) of Chinese 
investors to extant U.S. institutions. This Article will also provide 
preliminary empirical analysis of the investment’s potential threats to the 
United States by examining two much-debated topics: (1) the threat of 
Chinese investors’ acquisition of U.S. assets to U.S. national security and 
the adequacy of the CFIUS review regime to prevent or mitigate any such 
threat, especially after the recent landmark decision by the D.C. Circuit 
finding unconstitutional certain procedures of the CFIUS review in Ralls v. 
CFIUS, and (2) the threat of the Chinese variant of state capitalism to the 
U.S. model of free market capitalism. The following Part II presents an 




 60  Dylan Sutherland & John Anderson, The Pitfalls of Using Foreign Direct Investment Data to 
Measure Chinese Multinational Enterprise Activity, 221 CHINA Q. 21, 25–27 (2015). 
 61  SZAMOSSZEGI, supra note 20, at 30. 
 62  For example, the differences between Chinese FDI and Japanese FDI in terms of local hiring are 
attributed mostly to different stages of development of the two home countries. Yang et al., supra note 
41, at 156. Little did the author discuss any possible impact of the Japan–US FCN Treaty that allowed 
Japanese companies to appoint managers of their choice and the absence of such favorable treaty 
benefits for Chinese investors in the U.S. Though a few legal scholars have begun to pay attention to 
Chinese investment in the U.S., lacking empirical data, their research remains speculative. See, e.g., 
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Is the U.S. Ready for FDI from China? Lessons from Japan’s Experience in the 
1980s, in INVESTING IN THE UNITED STATES: IS THE U.S. READY FOR FDI FROM CHINA? 185 (Karl 
Sauvant, ed., 2009). 
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 II. A THEORY ABOUT CHINESE INVESTORS’ ADAPTATION 
AND THEIR POTENTIAL THREAT 
As noted in Part I, soaring investment outflows from China have 
generated intense debates and controversies. The current debate about 
China’s business expansion in the United States, in a nutshell, revolves 
around three different levels of threat: the threat of Chinese investment to 
U.S. national security, the threat to important interests of various social 
segments such as labor rights, and the systemic threat of the Chinese model 
of capitalism to free market economy. While the focus may vary, most 
parties to the debate share the under-investigated and under-theorized 
assumption that Chinese investors’ behavior systemically differs from their 
U.S. competitors’. 
This study contributes to the debate in two ways. First, it analyzes and 
then empirically explores the key assumption that Chinese investors act 
differently from their U.S. counterparts. Second, it engages in an 
interdisciplinary analysis of the U.S. institutions’ responses to the potential 
threat from China’s business expansion; it is unlikely for the perceived 
threat to materialize if there exist adequate preventive and remedial 
measures, or if the U.S. institutions prove more competitive and resilient. 
 A. The Desire and Ability to Adapt to U.S. Institutions 
As Professor Edward Steinfeld elaborates in the study of a major state-
owned Chinese oil company, Chinese investors may be adaptive and 
“playing our game” in the global market.63 To further explore the adaptation 
(or lack thereof) of Chinese companies, I employ a novel theory that 
unpacks the concept into two components, the desire to adapt to U.S. 
institutions and the ability to do so (See Figure 3).64 If Chinese companies 
investing in the United States have both a strong desire and ability to adapt 
(Quadrant IV of the two-by-two matrix), they will soon behave like their 
local competitors; hence posing limited threats to extant U.S. institutions. 
On the contrary, Chinese investors with neither the desire nor the ability to 
adapt will transplant their home country practices to the United States 
(Quadrant I), which may constitute a serious threat to the U.S. institutions 
or social segments that have not adopted adequate protective measures. 
Between the two ends of the spectrum are Chinese investors willing but 
incapable of adaptation (Quadrant III) and those able but unwilling to do so 
(Quadrant II). For purposes of this article, institutions are defined broadly to 
 
 63  STEINFELD, supra note 5. 
 64  In creating this typology, I draw on inspirations from the analytical framework for understanding 
state-private business relations in China, see Kellee S. Tsai, Capitalists Without a Class: Political 
Diversity Among Private Entrepreneurs in China, 38 COMP. POL. STUD. 1130, 1145 (2005). 
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include both formal rules such as laws and regulations, and informal rules 
such as socially accepted code of business conduct. 
From U.S. policy perspective, it should be optimal to have most of the 
Chinese companies fall into Quadrant IV, where they exhibit both the 
capacity and the desire to make necessary adjustments to the host country 
environment. Conversely, Quadrant I probably identifies the worst fear of 
those critical about Chinese outward investment. Quadrant III is not ideal 
either. While superficial adaptation and compliance with U.S. institutions 
may have been achieved, the Chinese investors will attempt to maintain 
home-country practices whenever possible, potentially causing conflicts in 
the host state, especially in areas of inadequate or uncertain formal 
regulations. Quadrant II presents situations where investors will adapt 
provided adequate capacity. Thus the threat tends to be temporary. This 
study will empirically assess the distribution of the adaptation behavior of 
Chinese companies investing in the United States. But before the 
evidentiary analysis, more conceptual elaboration is in order. 
 
Figure 3: Theoretical Framework for the Adaptation of Chinese Investors to 
U.S. Institutions 
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The desire and the ability to adapt are vague and broad concepts that 
have to be further deconstructed to enable empirical analysis. I postulate 
that Chinese investors’ desire to adapt is determined by two factors: (i) their 
investment motives, and (ii) their perceptions of U.S. institutions. On the 
other hand, the ability to adapt is a function of: (i) the corporate decision-
making power allocation, and (ii) the access and use of knowledge and 
skills requisite to make the adaptation. More details follow. 
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 1. The Desire to Adapt: Investment Motives and Perceptions of U.S. 
Institutions 
 (a) Investment Motives 
Motives are essential in setting behavior. Are foreign companies 
investing in the United States driven by political concerns or commercial 
interests? Companies following the government’s fiat to “go global” and 
invest in the United States do not necessarily think or behave rationally in 
the business sense, i.e., maximizing corporate profits, which presumably 
affects their desire to adapt to local conditions. In contrast, foreign investors 
attracted to the United States by business and commercial considerations 
should respond to incentive mechanisms in ways analogous to private 
companies. To them, U.S. regulatory and legal frameworks should function 
more effectively since they are usually designed to shape the behavior of 
rational business actors in a free market. 
The question is more acute with regard to investment from China, as 
the Chinese government plays a highly proactive role in regulating and 
managing economic affairs. The unique Chinese model of state-business 
relationships has been labeled state capitalism.65 A more systematic review 
of the topic will be postponed to Section VI(B), but a brief summary 
follows immediately to aid further discussion. 
Before initiating economic liberalization in the early 1980s, the 
Chinese government modeled its economic system after the Soviet Union 
and almost all business entities in China were collectively owned and 
managed.66 After various incremental reforms in the 1980s failed to 
improve the performance of the SOEs,67 Beijing decided to shed the 
liability by implementing massive privatization.68 Consequently, the state 
sector shrank and the central government retained control only over the 
largest SOEs in strategic and important sectors.69 
 
 65  A generally agreed definition of state capitalism is lacking. One defines it as “a system in which 
the state functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets primarily for political gain.” 
Bremmer, supra note 48, at 41; another defines state capitalism as “the widespread influence of the 
government in the economy, either by owning majority or minority equity positions in companies or by 
providing subsidized credit and/or other privileges to private companies.” ALDO MUSACCHIO & SERGIO 
G. LAZZARINI, REINVENTING STATE CAPITALISM 2 (2014). 
 66  Sujian Guo, The Ownership Reform in China: What Direction and How Far?, 36 J. OF CONTEMP. 
CHINA 553, 556 (2003). 
 67  Id. at 559. 
 68  Ross Garnaut et al., Impact and Significance of State-Owned Enterprise Restructuring in China, 
55 THE CHINA J. 35 (2006). 
 69  Id., at 52–53. “Between 1995 and 2001, the number of state-owned and state-controlled 
enterprises in China fell from 118,000 to 47,000 and total employment in the SOE sector fell by 36 
million.”  
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Meanwhile, the central government took a series of measures to 
further “modernize” the SOEs.70 As a result of the decade-long efforts, most 
of the remaining central SOEs have concentrated their profitable assets and 
operations in publicly listed companies with “modern” corporate 
governance.71 The privatization through listing on stock markets, domestic 
as well as foreign, diversified the ownership structure, enabled learning of 
foreign practices and expertise, and opened channels for future finance.72 
While by definition all SOEs are controlled by the government, the 
abstract term “state” does not adequately explain how these conglomerates 
are actually managed, and how they interact with government officials. 
Actions taken by Chinese SOEs vary as a function of multiple variables 
including the managers’ positions in the political hierarchy, ownership 
diversity and density, the managers’ promotion probability and political 
stature, and sectorial characteristics.73 Apart from the 140,000 SOEs 
currently in existence, it has been alleged that the Chinese government 
maintains close ties with private national champions and implements certain 
state policies through them.74  
China’s practice of state capitalism has also instigated the argument 
that Chinese companies expanding abroad serve primarily the interests of 
their home state, not their own or those of the host countries, especially in 
cases of unalloyed interests. Those on the other side of the debate, however, 
contend that commercial interests shape the investment behavior of Chinese 
companies. To maximize profits and minimize risk, Chinese investors 
aspire to “play our game” and do it well.75 This empirical study will weigh 
in on this debate by analyzing survey data about the investment motives of 
Chinese companies in the United States. 
 (b) Perceptions of U.S. Institutions  
Besides investment motives, perceptions also form an important part in 
the desire to adapt. Corporate executives who perceive their original 
management style and organizational structure to be highly efficient will be 
reluctant or refuse to make internal adjustments to comply with host 
country rules. Likewise, companies that view the host country institutions 
negatively will resist adaptation. Let me elaborate with the example of early 
 
 70  Ji Li, State-Owned Enterprises in the Current Regime of Investor-State Arbitration, in THE ROLE 
OF THE STATE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 380 (Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco eds., 2014). 
 71  Gongmeng Chen, Have China’s Enterprise Reforms Led to Improved Efficiency and 
Profitability?, 7 EMERGING MKTS. REV. 82, 87–88 (2006). 
 72  Id. 
 73  Li, supra note 70, at 380. 
 74  Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese 
Firm, 103 GEO. L. J. 665, 668–69 (2015). 
 75  STEINFELD, supra note 5, at 233. 
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Japanese investment in the United States.  
As a result of rising trade conflicts, rapid appreciation of yen, and 
quick economic recovery from World War II, the Japanese government 
reversed its policies of heavily regulating outbound investment in early 
1980s.76 A surge of Japanese outbound investment ensued.77 The Japanese 
corporate structure and management model were dramatically different 
from what had been familiar to American companies. Lifetime 
employment, strict corporate hierarchy, and a high level of homogeneity in 
the workforce contradicted not only the neo-classic economists’ 
prescriptions for corporate efficiency but also U.S. regulations against 
employment discrimination.78  
Many Japanese investors, regarding their model as superior to the one 
for American companies, were reluctant to adapt.79 It was therefore 
perceived as quite a common practice to fill positions in their U.S. 
operations with employees expatriated from Japan, and to reserve 
management positions for senior male Japanese.80 The Japanese 
government shared the perception, noting that it “had devised a Japan 
Model of growth far superior to the model long championed by the 
economically troubled United States.”81 Not until the persisting 
underperformance of the Japanese economy of the past two decades did the 
Japanese companies start to act more like their U.S. competitors.82  
In the meantime, the collision between the two systems forever altered 
the U.S. legal landscape. Besides the drastic reform of the national security 
review regime in response to surging Japanese acquisitions of strategic U.S. 
assets,83 American jurisprudence with regard to a wide variety of subject 
matter areas bears clear marks of legal responses to new legal issues 
associated with Japanese investors in the United States.84  
 
 76  See generally You-Il Lee, Political Economy of Korean and Japanese Foreign Direct Investment, 
29 J. OF CONTEMP. ASIA 462 (1999). 
 77  Id. 
 78  PETER HALL & DAVID SOSKICE, VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 99–100 (2001). 
 79  Yang et al., supra note 41, at 141. 
 80  Sara Clark, Maintaining Yoshino’s Traditional Hierarchy: The Roles of Gender and Race in 
Japanese Transplant Management, 9 J. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE MGM T. 6 (1996). 
 81  GERALD L. CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS: LEADERS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE 
LIMITS OF CHANGE 1 (1999). 
 82  Curtis J. Milhaupt, Is the U.S. Ready for FDI from China? Lessons from Japan’s Experience in 
the 1980s, in INVESTING IN THE UNITED STATES: IS THE U.S. READY FOR FDI FROM CHINA? 185 (Karl 
Sauvant, ed., 2009). 
 83  S. George Georgiev, The Reformed CFIUS Regulatory Framework: Mediating Between 
Continued Openness to Foreign Investment and National Security, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 125, 126 (2008). 
 84  For antitrust law, see, for example, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574 (1986), touching on issues such as the anti-trust effect of predatory pricing conspiracy; for treaty 
interpretation, see, for example, Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982), 
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Fast forward two decades, the Chinese government has shown 
analogous signs of self-confidence, especially after the global financial 
crisis.85 Having spent years learning from the West, high-ranking Chinese 
officials were suddenly awakened to the realization that “the teachers now 
have some problems.”86 Further encouraged by its relative insulation from 
the global recession, some in China now zealously advocate development 
models that substantially depart from the Washington Consensus.87 And a 
growing number of scholars have joined the enterprise of finding, 
constructing and debating a Beijing Consensus.88 
Whether Chinese investors set out to conquer the United States or 
adapt to the U.S. “rules of the game” hinges very much on their perceptions 
of the system. If confident about the efficacy of the Chinese ways of doing 
business, managing companies, interacting with government officials, and 
resolving disputes, Chinese investors will probably strive to maintain them, 
which will cause friction with the extant U.S. system. Conversely, if the 
Chinese investors view U.S. institutions positively, they should be less 
inclined to maintain their traditional practices and more willing to make 
necessary adjustments to satisfy the host environment. Part IV will provide 
some empirical evidence on these important issues. 
 2. Ability to Adapt: Decision-Making Power and Local Knowledge  
In addition to the “desire to adapt,” the actual adaptation of Chinese 
investors to U.S. institutions also turns on their ability to do so, which I 
contend is determined by: (1) the allocation of corporate decision-making 
power, and (2) the access and use of professional knowledge.  
Decision-making power is a critical factor because the Chinese 
investors, as sole or majority shareholders, are legally entitled to making all 
 
about the legal identity of U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents and treaty benefits, and Taisei Fire & 
Marine Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 535 (1995), clarifying the definition of permanent 
establishment in U.S. tax treaties. 
 85  Barry Naughton, China’s Economy: Complacency, Crisis & The Challenge of Reform, 143 
DAEDALUS, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 14, 14 (2014). 
 86  When Fortune Frowned, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/12373696. 
 87  Barry Naughton, China’s Distinctive System: Can it be a Model for Others?, 19 J. CONTEMP. 
CHINA 437, 437–40 (2010) [hereinafter Naughton, China’s Distinctive System]. 
 88  For the debate about Beijing Consensus, see Suisheng Zhao, The China Model: Can it Replace 
the Western Model of Modernization? 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 419, 419–36 (2010); Matt Ferchen, Whose 
China Model is it Anyway? The Contentious Search for Consensus, 20 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 390, 
391–96 (2013). For those who question the duplicability of the Beijing model, see Naughton, China’s 
Distinctive System, supra note 87 at 437; Scott Kennedy, The Myth of the Beijing Consensus, 19 J. 
CONTEMP. CHINA 461, 461–66 (2010). For those who argue against such a Beijing model, see Yang 
Jiang, Rethinking the Beijing Consensus: How China Responds to Crises, 24 PACIFIC REV. 337, 337–50 
(2011); Yasheng Huang, Rethinking the Beijing Consensus, 11 ASIA POL’Y 1, 11–24 (2011).  
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major operation decisions regarding their U.S. investment.89 Because the 
survey targets senior executives managing the U.S. businesses, we still need 
to know their de facto decision-making power within the corporate structure 
in order to connect the local desire to adapt (or lack thereof) with actual 
adaptive behavior. For instance, a Chinese firm’s U.S. subsidiary may be 
inclined to make adjustments, but its hands are tied if all calls are made by 
the Chinese parent company that does not share the same aspirations. 
Besides decision power allocation, the access and use of knowledge 
requisite for adaptation serves as another important component of the 
ability to adapt. The U.S. legal and regulatory systems are nothing but 
complex; it normally takes years of training and practice to build expertise 
in any field of U.S. law. Whether or not newly arrived Chinese investors 
can access and use the indigenous professional knowledge is central to their 
ability to adapt. This factor also relates to the allocation of corporate 
decision-making power because only effective incorporation of professional 
knowledge in U.S. operations will enable successful behavioral adaptation. 
 B. Are U.S. Institutions Vulnerable to Potential Threat from Chinese 
Investment? 
Another important yet under-explored factor in the debate about 
Chinese business globalization and its implications is the level of 
vulnerability of U.S. institutions when exposed to Chinese investment. 
Though the U.S. government has been relatively open towards foreign 
investment, over time it has put in place certain counter-threat institutional 
measures.90 Whether the perceived threats of Chinese investors will 
materialize, in case they refuse to adapt, depends to a great extent on the 
adequacy of these protective measures. Yet because the study of these 
measures—typically in the form of statutes and regulations—has been 
dominated by legal scholars, their effects have not been adequately 
addressed in the literature on Chinese business expansion. This article 
analyzes these under-explored issues in light of the recent landmark case 
Ralls v. CFIUS. 
Moreover, the Chinese model of state capitalism may appear 
formidable given the growing power of the Chinese government in 
allocating resources and manipulating the market to achieve its policy 
objectives. Yet it is possible, as contended by a few scholars, that the 
Chinese model is as fragile as “Japan Inc.” and will eventually yield to the 
U.S. variant of capitalism. This study will investigate these important 
questions from an interdisciplinary perspective. Before proceeding to the 
 
 89  See infra Figure 6. 
 90  For example, the measures to protect against national security threats have been codified in the 
CFIUS process. See infra Part VI.A for more details. 
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detailed substantive analysis, however, the following Part III briefly 
introduces the survey research, its administration, and the validity of the 
survey results.  
 III. SURVEY DESIGN AND ADMINISTRATION 
As noted in Part I, the studies on Chinese companies investing in the 
United States are limited in terms of methodology and scope. Most of the 
empirical research has so far relied on case studies91 or publicly available 
macro or firm-level data,92 causing potential biases in the findings that 
weaken or even undercut the theories induced therefrom. Moreover, most 
scholars focus on a narrow area of the debate, ignoring the apparent cross-
disciplinary nature of the issues bearing on Chinese direct investment in the 
United States. To fully assess their potential threats necessitates better 
understanding of not only the Chinese companies, but also the U.S. 
institutions exposed to the impact and the measures designed to prevent or 
ameliorate critical threats. 
As noted earlier, this Article fills the gaps by combining a 
comprehensive survey of Chinese investors in the United States with the 
analysis of relevant institutions such as the CFIUS review. This Part III 
provides a brief description of the design, administration and validity of the 
survey. 
 A. The Survey Design 
The survey was conducted in 2014 by a major non-profit business 
association of Chinese companies investing in the United States (the 
“Association”). The Association was planning to publish a year-end white 
paper and contemplated including some survey data. The author 
participated as an independent academic advisor for the survey project, and 
from time to time provided advice on the design and administration of the 
survey and the analysis of its results. The author received no compensation 
from the Association or any of its affiliated parties. 
The survey includes 128 questions in sixteen sections, covering a 
broad range of topics such as general business features of the responding 
company and perceptions of the U.S. business, legal and political systems.93 
 
 91  Xiaohua Yang et al., Internationalization of Chinese and Korean Firms, 51 THUNDERBIRD INT’L 
BUS. REV. 37, 38 (2009). For a few examples of such studies, see, for example, Yang et al., supra note 
41, at 156; Deng, supra note 58, at 410. 
 92  See, e.g., Buckley et al., supra note 45, at 499; Ramasamy et al., supra note 45, at 18.  
 93  The sixteen sections include the following: (1) Basic Information of the Firm; (2) Information 
about U.S. Business; (3) Trend of Business in the United States; (4) Evaluations on U.S. Business 
Environment; (5) Challenges to the Company; (6) Mergers and Acquisitions; (7) Legal and Compliance; 
(8) Dispute Resolution; (9) Human Resources; (10) Investment Protection; (11) National Security 
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The questions originated from three major sources. First, a portion of them 
were taken out of internal surveys from previous years.94 Second, some of 
the questions were added to address the major issues currently confronting 
Chinese firms that have already invested in the United States. Third, 
additional questions were inserted pertaining to the long-term performance 
of Chinese invested businesses and their interactions with U.S. institutions.  
A pilot study of the survey was conducted in June to evaluate the draft 
questions,95 and the subsequent revised draft was reviewed by an executive 
director of the Association, whose comments were partially reflected in the 
final version. To ensure truthfulness and accuracy, the survey was 
conducted anonymously.96 The survey questionnaires were completed by 
senior executives in management positions. Anticipating some of them to 
speak less-than-perfect English, all of the survey questions were prepared in 
simplified Chinese. 
 B. The Administration of the Survey 
The survey questionnaires were distributed in multiple ways. First, to 
ensure the responses derived from a diverse body of major Chinese 
investors in the United States, the questionnaires were target-distributed to 
all board members of the Association and its local chapters. Most of the 
members completed and returned the survey by the end of August 2014. 
Second, one of the executive directors of the Association conducted 
interviews with a few dozen Chinese investors and requested the 
interviewees to complete the survey questionnaires. Most of them timely 
returned completed questionnaires. 
The survey results were compiled by Association staff other than the 
interviewing director. The director did not access the aggregated data, nor 
was he informed about it, until the drafting of the white paper began. This 
division of labor helped avoid possible feedback bias from the interviewer. 
In addition, objectiveness and neutrality were emphasized repeatedly before 
and during the survey process. 
Third, approximately 200 surveys were mass-distributed to other 
members of the Association. A staff of the Association kept track of the 
 
Review and Anti-trust; (12) Tax; (13) Government Approval and Others; (14) Intellectual Property; (15) 
Contributions to the United States; (16) About the Association. Another participant in the survey added 
a few questions about intellectual property at the end of the survey after most of the results had been 
received. These questions would not be included in this study. 
 94  Only about thirty responses were received from the last year’s survey. The results were only 
published in an internal circulation. 
 95  The pilot study indicated that approximately thirty to forty minutes were needed to finish all of 
the questions. 
 96  In addition, those who were concerned about confidentiality were instructed to simply skip any 
question that made them uncomfortable. 
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distribution and followed up with emails and phone calls to remind the 
Chinese investors to complete the questionnaires, yet as expected, not many 
responded. 
 C. Validity of the Survey Results 
By October 2014, 101 responses had been received. Note that a 
random sample of all Chinese companies investing in the United States was 
not intended for the survey. For purposes of this study, the survey targeted a 
diverse group of medium to large-sized Chinese investors whose business 
expansion has significant or potentially significant impacts on the U.S. 
market. A take-out restaurant in New York City owned and operated by a 
Chinese family is not germane to this research, though a random sample of 
Chinese investors in the United States will certainly include many such 
small businesses. In other words, it is reasonable to assume that when 
people debate about the threats of Chinese economic expansion, they have 
in mind large multinational corporations, not Chinese-invested take-out 
restaurants or laundromats, which certainly account for a large number of 
Chinese investments in the United States. 
The survey respondents comprise a diverse group of medium and 
large-sized Chinese investors in the United States. Their diversity is assured 
by the high response rate from the board members of the Association and its 
local chapters, and the managers whom the director interviewed. The 
Association’s practice has been to nominate sizable Chinese companies of 
different sectors, locations, corporate structure, and ownership to lead the 
board and the local chapters. As illustrated by the data below, the sample 
exhibits a great diversity.  
First, as shown in Figure 4, the respondents vary in terms of their 
sectoral background. As many as seventeen reported to have business in the 
auto industry. Thirteen of the respondents operate in construction and real 
estate. The textile industry, closely followed by finance and energy, also 
attracts sizable groups of Chinese investors. Eight respondents have 
investments in both agriculture and information and electronic technology.97 
In line with the general trend of FDI outflows from China, most of the 
surveyed Chinese investors entered the U.S. market in the past decade. But 
a sizable portion of the respondents started their investment twenty or thirty 
years ago, which is attributable to the high percentage of SOEs in the 
survey sample, as the Chinese government allowed only large central and 
provincial trading companies to operate abroad before 1990.98 
  
 
 97  Twenty-three respondents conduct business in a sector not specified in the survey.  
 98  Yang et al., supra note 41, at 138. 
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Figure 4: Sectoral Distribution of Survey Respondents 
 
The survey respondents are diverse in terms of ownership character 
(See Figure 5). 35% of the respondents reported their investors to be 
completely private companies (with no state ownership). But state-
ownership is well represented; 27% of the respondents belong to Chinese 
investors that are wholly owned by the Chinese government. Additionally, 
23% report the state as the majority shareholder, and 7% have the state 
owning less than 50% but more than 10%. The distribution of ownership 
evidences the dominance of SOEs or their subsidiaries of Chinese FDI in 
the United States in terms of value.99 The high percentage of SOEs in the 
sample serves well the purposes of this study, as much of the debate about 
Chinese investments concerns the outbound expansion of the state sector 
and state capitalism. 
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Figure 5: Ownership Structure of the Chinese Investors 
 
 
In terms of ownership structure, the overwhelming majority of the 
survey respondents are 100% owned by their Chinese investors, and another 
12% of the respondents report Chinese investors owning the majority 
interest (See Figure 6). It is worth emphasizing once again that the sample 
does not constitute a random representation of all Chinese investments in 
the United States, and portfolio investors are largely absent.100 Portfolio 
investors that are passive holders of U.S. interests tend not to be vewied as 
a critical threat, as evidenced by their exclusion from the national security 
review of foreign acquisition of U.S. assets.101  
  
 
 100 Portfolio investment refers to the holding of interest or share of less than 10% of the invested 
entity. 
 101 Part 800 - Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 
31 C.F.R. § 800.302(b) (2016). 
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Figure 6: Ownership Structure of the U.S. Investment 
 
Moreover, the survey respondents hold investments in diverse 
locations (See Figure 7). California stands out as the most popular state for 
Chinese investors. New York, Michigan, New Jersey and Texas, in 
decreasing order of popularity, also attract fair amounts of Chinese 
investments. At least twelve other states each has a Chinese investor 
responding to the survey.  
 
Figure 7: Location Choice by Chinese Investors 
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In sum, this study moves a major step forward by using a 
comprehensive survey targeting medium and large-sized Chinese investors 
in the United States that fall squarely under the spotlight of the ongoing 
debate about China’s global business expansion and its implications. The 
sample of respondents represents a diverse group, and various measures 
were undertaken to ensure the objectiveness, accuracy, and truthfulness of 
the survey results. That being said, a word of caution is in order. 
Despite the care taken to ensure its quality, this survey cannot avoid 
some of the problems common to all survey-based research. First, the 
nonresponse problem from allowing respondents to skip questions that 
made them uncomfortable, which essentially reflects the tradeoff between 
receiving as many responses as possible and getting truthful but fewer 
responses. The missing data inevitably have a biasing effect on the survey 
results. Second, certain objective and subjective factors may systemically 
affect how the respondents answer the questionnaires. For instance, 
managers of SOE investments in the United States may intentionally or 
subconsciously align their responses to the perceived dominant party line. 
Such issues and their effect on the survey results will be discussed in more 
detail when specific data are presented and analyzed in following Part IV. 
 IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY STUDY 
Before proceeding to the in-depth discussion, this section begins with 
a quick summary of the survey findings. First, preliminary results generally 
support the view that China’s business expansion is unlikely to pose a 
critical threat to U.S. institutions in the next decade. Most Chinese 
companies appear to fall into Quadrant IV of the two-by-two matrix (See 
Figure 3), and therefore are adapting to the host country environment and 
are basically “playing our game.”102 To be more specific, the investors are 
mostly motivated by commercial interests; they perceive the U.S. system 
positively and are aware of their lack of local knowledge, so in adapting to 
the new environment the Chinese investors rely heavily on professionals 
and local talent. In contrast to Japanese companies that transplanted the 
traditional business model to their U.S. investments in the 1980s,103 many 
Chinese investors seem willing and ready to make necessary adjustments. 
As a result, the Chinese investors act like their local competitors in the 
sophisticated U.S. market and the complex U.S. regulatory system. 
 
 102 STEINFELD, supra note 5, at 18.  
 103 Yang et al., supra note 41, at 141; Eileen M. Mullen, Note, Rotating Japanese Managers in 
American Subsidiaries of Japanese Firms: A Challenge for American Employment Discrimination Law, 
45 STAN. L. REV. 725, 725–31 (1992). 
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 A. The Desire of Chinese Investors to Adapt to U.S. Institutions 
 1. Motives of Chinese Investment in the United States 
As discussed in Part II, investment motives form a key part of the 
desire to adapt. Are Chinese investments in the United States driven by 
political concerns of the Chinese government or commercial interests of 
profit-seeking enterprises? Investments motivated by Chinese state policies 
and political factors are apparently more suspicious to U.S. policymakers. 
Chinese SOEs, as well as private Chinese companies with colorable 
government connections, inevitably draw heightened scrutiny when 
venturing abroad. Illustrative examples include CNOOC’s failed bid for 
UNOCAL and CFIUS’s demand for Huawei, a private Chinese company 
founded by a former army engineer,104 to divest from 3Leaf, a U.S. 
company whose core assets constitute patents worth merely $2 million.105 
Presumably, Chinese investors closely following the government’s 
order to “go global” would be less sensitive to the distinct features of U.S. 
institutions and less inclined to adjust. By comparison, Chinese investors 
attracted solely by the U.S. market and other business considerations should 
respond to incentive mechanisms in ways similar to their American 
competitors. Everything else being equal, they will desire to adapt as long 
as doing so makes commercial sense. In other words, it is more likely for 
the U.S. regulatory and legal frameworks to be effective in regulating 
Chinese investors who share the same set of motives as domestic U.S. 
companies, since they are mostly designed to shape the behavior of rational 
business actors in a market economy.  
Scholars are at odds on the investment motives of Chinese companies. 
Some portray the Chinese government as a puppeteer pulling strings of 
outbound investments.106 Under this account, investment decisions are 
driven primarily by government policies, not by business concerns.107 
Others, while acknowledging that the rather distinct state-business relations 
in China may distort investment motives, contend that years of reforms 
have, by and large, commercialized Chinese SOEs.108 Moreover, the lack of 
 
 104 David Barboza, China Telecom Giant, Thwarted in U.S. Deals, Seeks Inquiry to Clear Name, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/technology/26huawei.html. 
 105 Shayndi Raice & Andrew Dowell, Huawei Drops U.S. Deal Amid Opposition, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 
22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703407304576154121951088478. 
 106 For a summary of this camp of scholars, see J. M. F. Blanchard, Chinese MNCs as China’s New 
Long March: A Review and Critique of the Western Literature, 16 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 91, 95 (2011). 
 107 See, e.g., Mark Yaolin Wang, The Motivations Behind China’s Government-Initiated Industrial 
Investments Overseas, 75 PAC. AFF. 187, 189 (2002); SZAMOSSZEGI, supra note 20, at 29. 
 108 See, e.g., STEINFELD, supra note 5, at 49–59; ERICA DOWNS, INSIDE CHINA, INC: CHINA 
DEVELOPMENT BANK’S CROSS-BORDER ENERGY DEALS 2–5 (John L. Thornton China Ctr. at Brookings 
Inst. 2011). 
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effective central state control also contributes to corporate autonomy of the 
SOEs’ foreign subsidiaries.109 Thus, one may infer that in spite of the 
delicate balancing between state policy interests and corporate commercial 
interests, most Chinese SOEs are profit-driven most of the time, resulting in 
their mindful and keen adaptation to host country institutions.  
This survey-based study adds a valuable empirical angle to this 
ongoing debate. The preliminary survey results indicate Chinese investors 
in the United States are mostly driven by commercial incentives. The 
responding companies invested in the United States mainly for its huge 
market, advanced technologies, and brand enhancement.110 Gaining control 
over natural resources, the incentive that has received extensive 
international media coverage, appears to play a negligible role in the 
decisions to expand into the United States. Moreover, the finding does not 
bear out the popular view that cash-rich Chinese investors are making 
profligate acquisitions in the United States, given that only two survey 
respondents invested in order to find an exit for surplus capital at home (See 
Figure 8). In addition, two companies made investments to lower trade 
costs. This differentiates Chinese investors from their Japanese counterparts 
in the 1980s that were driven by, inter alia, trade conflicts and the forced 
appreciation of yen.111 
  
 
 109 Antoine Kernen & Katy N. Lam, Workforce Localization among Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) in Ghana, 23 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 1053 (2014). 
 110 This is consistent with the findings from the studies of overall Chinese FDI. See, e.g., Agyenim 
Boateng et al., Cross-Border M&As by Chinese Firms: An Analysis of Strategic Motives and 
Performance, 50 THUNDERBIRD INT’L BUS. REV. 259, 259 (2008). 
 111 Young-Kwan Yoon, The Political Economy of Transition: Japanese Foreign Direct Investments 
in the 1980s, WORLD POL., Oct. 1990, at 14. These companies were concentrated in certain sectors such 
as steel and solar panel where significant trade barriers exist. Jean-Francois Hennart & Young-Ryeol 
Park, Location, Governance, and Strategic Determinants of Japanese Manufacturing Investment in the 
United States, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 419, 428–30 (1994).  
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Figure 8: Motives for Investing in the United States 
 
Moreover, the survey results partially explain the clustering of Chinese 
investment in the United States, a phenomenon previous studies have 
largely overlooked.112 Twenty-three companies selected “meeting the needs 
of current Chinese customers to grow in the United States” as a reason for 
their entry into the U.S. market. Furthermore, the survey results do not 
affirm the view that personal preferences of individual investors or senior 
managers motivated business expansion in the United Sates, for only two 
responding companies took the plunge due to the immigration intent of their 
investors or managers.113 Though a large number of wealthy Chinese invest 
in the United States to obtain permanent residency,114 most of these 
 
 112 One study notes that Chinese SOEs are unlike Japanese keiretsu in exhibiting the clustering 
effect in FDI. See Yang et al., supra note 41, at 157. 
 113 They can do so through obtaining L1 visa or permanent residency via EB-5. 
 114 Alana Semuels, Should Congress Let Wealthy Foreigners Buy Green Cards? THE ATLANTIC 
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investors keep their primary business in China,115 so their profiles did not 
feature prominently in the survey.  
Furthermore, the survey results shed light on the effect of the Chinese 
government’s “go global” policies. As noted, China has been actively 
promoting the expansion of Chinese companies abroad in the past decade. 
Over time, it has adopted a series of policies to encourage outbound 
investment, and several studies highlight the influence of such state 
intervention.116 The survey results, however, indicate that the government’s 
incentives play, at best, an indirect role in the Chinese companies’ decisions 
to enter the U.S. market. To those Chinese investors that conducted M&A 
in the United States, only seven selected Chinese government policy as 
having influenced their decisions. Of course, the Chinese government 
policies generally reflect the rationales listed in the survey, e.g., gaining 
U.S. market share or famous brands,117 so these findings cannot rule out 
indirect influence of the policies. But they certainly indicate that Beijing 
either lacks the capacity of, or chooses to refrain from, micro-managing 
cross-border business transactions of Chinese companies.118 
Commercial motives are also evident in the investors’ location choice. 
In response to the survey question, sixty picked “proximity to major 
clients” as an important consideration. Thirty-one chose convenient 
transportation as a key factor. Twenty-eight respondents considered the 
location in big cities to be important for enhancing the investors’ global 
profile. In addition, high quality employee pool, proximity to major 
suppliers, and fine infrastructure were considered important by seventeen, 
sixteen, and fifteen respondents respectively.  
Indirectly, the commercial motivation of Chinese investments is also 
evidenced by their profit rates. Unlike policy-driven investors that often 
assume or tolerate higher losses, at least in the short term, the respondents 
report profits comparable to those from their investments elsewhere. 38% of 
the respondents found their U.S. profits to be on par with their global 
 
foreigners-buy-citizenship/406432/; Frank Shyong, Visa Program for Wealthy Investors Maxed Out by 
Chinese Demand, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-0830-chinese-visas-
20140830-story.html.  
 115 Id. (“Most of the people who want to do this are wealthy and they’re doing it for their kids”); 
Zhongguo Yicheng Duoguo Zhuyao Yimin Laiyuanguo Disanbo Yiminchao Yonglai [China Became 
Major Source of Immigrants for Several Countries, Arrives the Third Wave of Immigration] 
(中国已成多国主要移民来源国 第三波移民潮涌来), CHINESE YOUTH (中国青年报) (Sept. 22, 
2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-09/22/c_1112566061.htm. 
 116 Buckley et al., supra note 45; Quer et. al., supra note 46, at 1089; Alessia A. Amighini et al., Do 
Chinese State-Owned and Private Enterprises Differ in their Internationalization Strategies? 27 CHINA 
ECON. REV. 312, 320 (2013). 
 117 SZAMOSSZEGI, supra note 20, 22–23. 
 118 Here, the issue of bias mentioned in Part III does not appear to be significant, because to stay in 
line with the Chinese government’s policy, the respondents would have chosen “government policy” as 
a major explanation for them to invest in the United States. 
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profits. 25% reported U.S. profits higher than global profits, and the same 
percentage of respondents had lower U.S. profits. In addition, 90% of the 
respondents reported increasing or steady revenue in 2013, and about half 
made even or a profit.119  
The survey results also indicate that Chinese investments in the United 
States will continue to grow. 33% of the companies ranked the U.S. market 
as the top destination for their global investment for the near future, and 
another 28% ranked it as a top three (See Figure 9). Only 6% companies 
marked the United States as not an important investment destination. In 
addition, most of the Chinese investors were satisfied with their U.S. 
investment (only seven expressed dissatisfaction in the survey). Probably as 
a result of self-selection, 76% of the respondents were optimistic about their 
U.S. business in the next three to five years. 
 





 119 One may be concerned that the SOE managers systemically under or over-report their profit 
levels in the United States. It is possible; but if it is indeed the case, we should observe a distribution of 
the responses to be either left-skewed or right-skewed. Both distributions are of a normal shape, 
suggesting that misreporting is not a systemic issue here. 
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 2. Perceptions of U.S. Business, Legal, and Political Institutions  
Besides investment motives, perceptions should also play an important 
role in determining Chinese investors’ desire to adapt to a host country’s 
environment. Presumably, the investors will be more inclined to make 
radical adjustments if they perceive U.S. institutions positively. As noted 
earlier, the confidence of Japanese investors in their own business model 
likely contributed to the reluctance to adapt in the 1980s.120 Similarly, the 
Chinese ruling elites have demonstrated growing confidence, especially 
after the global financial crisis.121 Do Chinese investors share the self-
confidence and therefore hesitate about adapting to U.S. institutions? The 
survey results provide first-hand information on this important subjective 
question that has been largely neglected in previous studies. 
 (a) The U.S. Social and Political System 
Let us begin with how Chinese investors view the U.S. social and 
political system. As noted earlier, several major events in the past few years 
have had detrimental effect on the reputation of basic U.S. institutions. To 
many, the global financial crisis revealed the flaws and dire consequences 
of loose government regulations that reflected the deep-rooted faith in the 
self-discipline and efficiency of free market capitalism.122 The subsequent 
government intervention in economic restructuring at both the federal and 
state level further justified the argument that government ought to play a 
more proactive role in regulating the economy. Yet at the moment effective 
governance became imperative, the world instead observed political 
paralysis in Washington, D.C.123  
The Chinese official media has not spared the United States of 
negative publicity. American politics has been portrayed as conservative, 
chaotic, and U.S.-centered,124 and as signaling the decay of Western 
 
 120 See the discussion supra Part II.A.1.b. 
 121 Barry Naughton, China’s Economy: Complacency, Crisis & the Challenge of Reform, supra note 
85. 
 122 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT 
INTO DEPRESSION (2009). 
 123 See, e.g., Palash Ghosh, Government Shutdown 2013: How Foreign Media Sees The Debacle in 
Washington, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/government-shutdown-2013-
how-foreign-media-sees-debacle-washington-1425068; Keiko Ujikane, Biggest US Foreign Creditors 
Show Concern on Default Risk, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-
08/japan-aso-warns-on-effect-of-any-u-s-default-on-reserves-value.html. 
 124 See, e.g., Meiguo Zhengfu Guanmen: Qiandaishang de Duikang (美国政府关门: 
钱袋上的对抗) [American Government Shut Down, A Fight for Money], XIN JING BAO (新京报) (Oct. 
19, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-10/19/c_117783388.htm; Meiguo Lianbang Zhengfu 
Guanmen Fengbo Shuoming Shenmo (美国联邦政府关门风波说明什么？) [What Does the US 
Government Shutdown Tell Us?] , GUANGMINGWANG (光明网) (Oct. 28, 2013),  
36_1_3_LI SUPERFINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/16 3:28 PM 
Chinese Business Expansion 
36:143 (2016) 
175 
democracy.125 At the same time, the state media advocates that the Chinese 
system, characterized by political stability, social harmony, and sustained 
economic development, provides a desirable alternative to the U.S. 
institutions.126 The question pertinent to this study is whether Chinese 
investors have internalized this rhetoric and become advocates and 
practitioners of the Chinese model when they invest in the United States.  
As demonstrated below, the survey findings indicate quite the 
opposite. Chinese investors share highly positive views of U.S. social and 
political systems. 75% of the respondents view the U.S. political system to 
be stable or very stable, in contrast with only 2% who considered it to be 
unstable.127 Likewise, on the question about social openness and 
inclusiveness, only 2% expressed a negative view. The perception is even 
more positive when it comes to social fairness, as merely 1% of the 
respondents thought the United States to be an unfair society. In addition, 
Chinese investors admire the United States for its capacity to innovate, with 





 125 Touxi Meiguo Zhengfu Guanmen Fengbo (透析美国政府关门风波) [Analysis of American 
Government Shutdown] , QIUSHILILUNWANG (求是理论网) (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.qstheory.cn/ 
zs/201310/t20131023_281996.htm. 
 126 Sun Tiexiang et al., Zhidu Zixin Zhigen Zhongguo (制度自信 植根中国) [Confidence in Chinese 
Institutions], XINHUANET (新华网) (Sept. 16, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/2014-
09/16/c_1112498276.htm.; Xie Yahong et al., Hao Zhidu Rang Zhongguo Anding Youxu Chongman 
Huoli (好制度让中国安定有序充满活力), [Good Institutions Stabilize and Energize China], PEOPLE’S 
DAILY (Sept. 7, 2014), http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0907/c1002-25617441.html. 
 127 In a range of 1 to 5, 1 being very unstable, and 5 very stable, 98% chose 3 and above. 
 128 Here, systemic bias due to political concerns of the SOE managers, if any, would have been 
reflected in more negative views of U.S. institutions, provided the Chinese government official rhetoric 
desecrating the Western system. The survey results show quite the opposite. 
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Figure 10: Perceptions of Extant US Institutions  
 
 (b) The U.S. Business Environment 
Chinese business environment differs from that of the United States. It 
is conceivable that Chinese managers, having successfully built multi-
national enterprises large enough to invest in the United States, have gained 
ample confidence in the efficacy of their time-honored way of doing 
business, regardless of the context. If so, they would be reluctant to engage 
in any substantial behavioral adjustment after investing in the United States 
and continue to transact in the Chinese way. To address these questions, the 
survey inquired about the Chinese investors’ perceptions of the U.S. 
business environment.  
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the respondents considered business transactions and conduct of American 
firms to be transparent or highly transparent. The percentage is even higher 
(94%) for the perception of Chinese investors about business ethics in the 
United States. And on the question about compliance with the code of 
business conduct, 98% of the respondents considered U.S. companies to be 
in good standing.  
Because the Chinese media occasionally portrayed the United States as 
being hostile towards Chinese investors, citing cases such as CNOOC’s 
failed bid for UNOCAL and the blockage of Huawei from the U.S. market, 
the survey included several questions to assess the views of Chinese 
investors on equality in U.S. business environment, i.e., no discriminatory 
treatment of foreign companies, customers or investors. Only 5% of the 
respondents felt unfairly treated, and 26% expressed a neutral view, 
compared to 69% who saw the U.S. business environment to be equal or 
highly equal.129 
 (c) The U.S. Legal System 
Another major institutional difference between China and the United 
States resides in judicial independence and authority. While in the United 
States courts are recognized as a pillar of the political system separate and 
independent of the legislature and the executive branches, courts in China 
are heavily controlled by the party state.130 Hence, law enforcement in 
China is often contingent on the power distribution of the stakeholders.131 In 
response, Chinese firms rely more often on informal institutions such as 
personal connections,132 and regulations and laws are frequently evaded, 
neglected, or treated as mere costs of doing business.133 
It is plausible that Chinese companies, when expanding abroad, carry 
the attitude towards law and courts with them, as illustrated by anecdotal 
reports of Chinese investors violating labor rights, disregarding 
environmental protection law, and bribing officials.134 The issue is 
 
 129 Again, party line bias would have been reflected in more negative views. So the results suggest 
that the bias, if any, is limited for this specific set of questions. 
 130 Benjamin L. Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 THE CHINA Q. 620, 620 (2007); 
Ji Li, Dare You Sue the Tax Collector? An Empirical Study of Tax-Related Administrative Lawsuits 
Against Tax Agencies in China, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 57, 69 (2014). 
 131 Ji Li, Does Law Matter in China? An Empirical Study of a Limiting Case, 46 GEO. WASH. INT’L 
L. REV. 119, 155–56 (2014). 
 132 Katherine K. Xin & Jone L. Pearce, Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for Formal Institutional 
Support, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1641, 1654 (1996). 
 133 See generally BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ, REGULATING LAND AND POLLUTION IN CHINA: 
LAWMAKING, COMPLIANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT; THEORY AND CASES (2006). 
 134 Alfred Atakora et al., Globalization and Emergent Africa-Asia Dialogue: The Good, the Bad and 
the Ugly, 7 AFR. J. BUS. MGMT. 3694, 3697 (2013); Angela Dziedzom Akorsu & Fang Lee Cooke, 
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important for understanding their adaptation, as the reading of U.S. law and 
courts to be corrupt or systemically biased will presumably affect the 
investors’ compliance inclination. 
The survey included a number of questions addressing this issue. 
Unsurprisingly, many respondents considered formal U.S. laws to be 
complex and confusing (29%). But the perception does not appear to affect 
the generally positive view held by the Chinese investors about the 
sensibility of U.S. law. We asked their opinions about U.S. tax law, well 
known to be the most complex substantive law, in comparison to Chinese 
tax law. Only 2% of the respondents considered U.S. tax law to be more 
unreasonable than Chinese tax rules. Though the majority held a neutral 
view, 46% of the respondents thought U.S. tax law to be more reasonable. 
This result is remarkable considering that only 3% of the respondents 
thought U.S. tax burden to be less than in China and 63% considered their 
U.S. tax liabilities to be either heavier or much heavier than their Chinese 
taxes. 
While Chinese firms tend to distrust the courts and arrange their 
business under informal institutions135 or use biased judges to gain favors,136 
those that have invested in the United States shared a generally positive 
view of the U.S. judiciary. 51% of the respondents considered U.S. courts 
to be fair or very fair. 46% held neutral opinions and merely 3% of the 
respondents saw U.S. courts as unfair.  
In strong contrast to the favorable views of U.S. business, political and 
legal environments, the respondents reacted negatively to questions about 
several specific issues. Only 11% of the Chinese investors considered the 
enforcement of anti-dumping and countervailing duty rules to be 
reasonable. 46% of the respondents were neutral, and 42% considered them 
unreasonable or highly unreasonable. On the question about CFIUS review, 
43% of Chinese companies expressed lack of knowledge, and 43% 
considered the process to be politically charged. Only 13% expressed a 
positive view. These results are probably reactions to the highly arbitrary 
nature of these measures.137 On the attitude of U.S. Congress towards 
Chinese companies and products, 30% of the respondents chose “unfair” or 
“highly unfair”, 53% held a neutral view, and merely 16% expressed 
positive opinions.  
 
Labour Standards Application among Chinese and Indian Firms in Ghana: Typical or Atypical? 22 
INT’L J. HUM. RES. MGMT. 2730, 2730 (2011). 
 135 Katherine K. Xin & Jone L. Pearce, Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for Formal Institutional 
Support, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1641, 1641–42 (1996). 
 136 Yuen Yuen Ang & Nan Jia, Perverse Complementarity: Political Connections and the Use of 
Courts among Private Firms in China, 76 J. POL. 318, 318 (2014). 
 137 For the arbitrariness of U.S. antidumping measures, see Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s 
Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 2 (2012). For more discussion about the CFIUS review process, 
see infra Part VI.A. 
36_1_3_LI SUPERFINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/16 3:28 PM 
Chinese Business Expansion 
36:143 (2016) 
179 
Such relatively negative views, however, do not reflect the general 
impression of Chinese investors about public administration in the United 
States. When asked to compare government review and approval 
procedures of the United States with China, 60% of the respondents found 
the burden to be less in the United States, and only 12% considered the 
procedures to be slightly more cumbersome. Moreover, 66% of the Chinese 
investors considered the procedures in the United States to be more 
transparent than in China, on which only 5% disagreed. Moreover, negative 
perceptions of the federal agencies and procedures are not unique for the 
Chinese investors; American public shares similar views. Most would 
endorse the fundamental political regime but be critical about the 
administration, especially at the federal level.138 
In sum, despite its relative economic decline, the United States still 
enjoys enormous “soft power,” a term coined by Joseph Nye to mean the 
ability of a country to “get other countries to want what it wants.”139 The 
survey results demonstrates that commercially-motivated Chinese investors 
perceive the U.S. political, business, and legal systems positively, which 
sets the stage for quick adaptation of Chinese companies to the U.S. “rules 
of the game.” Part V will elaborate with more details of the actual 
adaptation. 
B. The Ability to Adapt to U.S. Institutions 
The second variable for investment adaptation is the ability to adapt. 
As noted earlier, the ability to adapt varies in accordance with the allocation 
of decision-making power in the investor’s corporate structure, and the 
access and use of knowledge requisite for adaptation. 
 1. The Allocation of Decision-Making Power 
As noted, 68% of the respondents reported that their Chinese investors 
held 100% of the interests in the U.S. investment, and another 11% held 
less than 100% but more than 50% of the interests in the U.S. business (See 
Figure 6). Only 6% held minority interests. The majority ownership should 
entitle the Chinese parents to absolute legal control over the operation of 
their U.S. subsidiaries. Yet on the other hand, it will be costly and 
inefficient for the Chinese investors to dictate their U.S. operations given 
the differences between the two markets. For our study, the decision-
making power allocation is important because decisions of the Chinese 
 
 138 A recent survey indicates that only 24% of American citizens trust the federal government. See 
Public Trust in Government: 1958–2014, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.people-
press.org/2014/11/13/public-trust-in-government/. 
 139 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power, 80 FOREIGN POL’Y 153, 166 (1990). 
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parents presumably reflect more of the Chinese political, business, and legal 
contexts, not the desire of the local subsidiaries, if any, to adapt to U.S. 
institutions.140  
Since it is difficult to gauge accurately how decision-making power (a 
broad and nebulous term) is allocated between the executives of the 
Chinese parents and their U.S. subsidiaries or branches, this study focuses 
on a proxy variable, i.e., the specific power to decide on important 
personnel matters concerning the U.S. operations that is at the center of 
corporate management power. 13% of the Chinese respondents reported 
that their parent Chinese companies made all-important personnel decisions 
for the U.S. business. And another 33% reported that the Chinese 
headquarters made the decisions, but based on consultation with local 
managers. Among the rest, in 34% of the cases the local managers made the 
personnel decisions for the U.S. business, after consulting with the Chinese 
headquarters, and 17% reported the U.S. managers to have full authority 
over personnel decisions for the U.S. operation. In a nutshell, the odds favor 
the executives stationed in the United States to decide key issues 
concerning the U.S. investments, though the gap is rather small (51% v. 
46%).141 In addition, unlike the rank-and-file staff expatriated from China, 
the managers are normally assigned to work long-term in the United States. 
Many expect to stay for longer than five years.142  
To sum up this subsection, though the ownership structure of most 
Chinese companies in the United States is such that their Chinese parents 
could wield absolute control over the operation of their U.S. investments, in 
practice the local managers sharing the positive outlook of U.S. institutions 
are often the decision-makers, and their interests should be better aligned 
with the performance of the U.S. investments given their relatively long-
term assignment. 
 2. Access and Use of Knowledge and Skills Requisite for 
Adaptation 
Another factor that determines the ability to adapt is access and use of 
local and professional knowledge about the U.S. institutions. Without it 
Chinese investors inclined to adapt cannot succeed given the significant 
differences between the two countries. Companies that have been 
accustomed to lax enforcement of law in China face formidable challenges 
 
 140 A recent empirical study of Chinese companies investing in Germany found no rigid rules 
regarding the allocation of decision-making power between Chinese parents and their German 
subsidiaries. See Yun Schüler-Zhou & Margot Schüller, An Empirical Study of Chinese Subsidiaries’ 
Decision-Making Autonomy in Germany, 12 ASIAN BUS. & MGMT. 321, 321 (2013). 
 141 2% chose the other option, probably indicating a fully consensus-based decision-making 
procedure involving both the Chinese headquarter and the U.S. operation.  
 142 This is in accordance with the survey data. 
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adapting to the more sophisticated and stringent U.S. regulatory and legal 
environment. One way to overcome such barriers is by forming a joint 
venture with U.S. parties. An earlier study of Chinese multinational 
corporations in general found the method to be highly popular, with 79% 
operating abroad through joint ventures.143 However, Chinese companies 
investing in the United States strongly prefer the use of subsidiaries (See 
Figure 6). Without a local partner, these investors have to rely on internal 
and external professionals to overcome the knowledge and skill gap. 
The survey results show a high ratio of respondents with full-time in-
house counsel. 32% reported to have in-house counsel who was a licensed 
lawyer, whereas 12% had in-house counsel who did not pass any bar. 
Another 16% of the respondents did not yet have an in-house counsel, but 
were planning to hire one. So in total 60% of the respondents had full-time 
staff to oversee the legal matters of their investments in the United States. 
Besides law, regulatory compliance is also an area that sets China 
apart from the United States. It is reasonable to suspect that Chinese 
investors, given their records in China,144 may demonstrate compliance 
weakness in the United States. The survey results, however, present 
preliminary evidence of the opposite. 27% of the respondents reported to 
have full-time staff in charge of compliance work. Another 18% had their 
in-house counsel handle compliance. And 18% of the Chinese investors did 
not currently have any full-time employee for compliance, but were 
planning to hire one. Thus, only 36% of the respondents neither had nor 
intended to add such a position. 
Moreover, according to the survey findings in-house professionals 
were entrusted with significant authority. For Chinese companies that had 
in-house counsel, we inquired about the importance of their advice for 
management decision-making. 67% of the respondents answered 
“important” or “very important”. Only 4% thought in-house counsel 
opinions unimportant. Likewise, on the influence of the opinions of 
compliance officers, 71% of the respondents chose “important” or “very 
important,” and only 4% thought the opposite.  
Given the complexity of the U.S. law, in-house counsel or compliance 
staff can hardly handle all the matters that may legally implicate the 
Chinese investors. Does the reliance on professionals reach outside the 
firms? The survey findings again answer in the positive. 65% of the 
 
 143 Yang et al., supra note 41, at 152. 
 144 For discussion about Chinese companies’ lack of compliance with labor law, see, for example, 
SEAN COONEY ET AL., LAW AND FAIR WORK IN CHINA 133–34 (2013). For discussion about compliance 
with environmental protection law, see, for example, Benjamin Van Rooij, Regulating Land and 
Pollution at Lake Dianchi: Compliance and Enforcement in a Chinese and Comparative Perspective, in 
MATTIAS BURELL & MARINA SVENSSON, MAKING LAW WORK: CHINESE LAWS IN CONTEXT 374–76 
(2010).  
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respondents frequently engaged American lawyers and 33% had 
occasionally used their service, which leaves only 2% to have never used a 
U.S. lawyer. In choosing a U.S. lawyer, the Chinese investors paid the most 
attention to the lawyer’s practice experience in relevant areas, followed by 
legal fee and the lawyer or law firm’s general reputation. Only a few paid 
attention to the lawyer’s government connections or Chinese background, 
and even fewer cared about the lawyer’s educational background. These 
results indicate a rather sophisticated understanding by Chinese investors of 
the U.S. market for legal service. Factors that may be more important in 
China, e.g., good government connections, are not highly valued by most 
Chinese investors in the United States. 
In addition, the overall perception of the legal services provided by 
American lawyers appears positive. When asked to rate the level of 
satisfaction with the work of American lawyers on a one to five scale (one 
being very unsatisfied, five being very satisfied), 55% chose four and 9% 
chose five. Only 3% chose two, and no one chose one. Judging from such 
feedback, Chinese investors will continue to rely on U.S. lawyers while 
adapting to U.S. institutions.145  
The survey also indicates that, analogous to in-house counsel and 
compliance officers, U.S. lawyers play a major part in the decision-making 
of Chinese investors. On the role of professional legal advice in their 
investment or purchase decisions in the United States, 45% of the 
respondents reported to have consulted American lawyers prior to making 
their decisions, and the legal advice played an important role. 34% 
consulted U.S. lawyers prior to the decision, and the legal advice was used 
as a reference. 11% consulted U.S. lawyers after the decision, but 
considered their advice to be important, in comparison to 5% who acquired 
a legal opinion after the decision and used it as a reference. Only 5% of the 
respondents never consulted a U.S. lawyer in making the decision.  
When asked why U.S. lawyers would not be consulted, “high legal 
cost” was the most cited reason, followed by “lack of reliable American 
lawyers.” Cultural reasons such as the “fear of signaling hostility or lack of 
trust” that characterize Chinese dispute resolution did not seem to matter 
much.146 Only one Chinese investor chose not to consult any U.S. lawyer to 
avoid sending the signal, and two decided not to engage lawyers because 
they transacted with acquaintances.  
In sum, the generally positive perceptions of the U.S. political, 
business, and legal systems, combined with the allocation of decision-
 
 145 This should also be a result of selection. Companies presumably engage those lawyers on 
repeated basis whose service is considered satisfactory.  
 146 Ji Li, Interactions between Domestic Social Norms and International Law over Trade Dispute 
Resolution, in THE RULE OF LAW AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS: CONTESTATIONS 
AND DEFERENCE (Machiko Kanetake & Andraé Nollkaemper eds.) (forthcoming). 
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making power favoring executives stationed in the United States, the 
alliance of their interests with investment performance, and the heavy 
reliance on U.S. professionals and local talent set a favorable tone for 
prompt adaptation of Chinese investors to the host country environment.  
Yet caution should be exercised before drawing a definitive conclusion 
that adaptive Chinese investors would not pose a critical threat to extant 
U.S. institutions. First, the theory may not have exhausted all relevant 
factors determining the adaptation of Chinese investors in the United States. 
Thus, it is possible that due to some omitted variables adaptation does not 
occur, or occurs slowly or in a non-linear fashion. Second, the findings 
about the ability to adapt present a mixed picture. Nearly half of the 
respondents reported the Chinese headquarters calling the shots about their 
U.S. operation. It is less clear whether these investors will respond to U.S. 
institutions in the same way as those locally managed. Additionally, much 
of the threat-no-threat question also depends on available preventive and 
remedial measures. Even if a fraction of Chinese investors fail to adapt, 
they may not pose an immediate threat provided the U.S. institutions are 
equipped with effective defense mechanisms. 
Taking these issues into account, the following Part V conducts an in-
depth case study of Chinese investors’ adaptation to U.S. institutions on 
employment discrimination. Part VI then explores two much-debated 
threats from Chinese business expansion in the United States, the threat to 
national security and the threat of the Chinese variant of state capitalism to 
the U.S. model of free market capitalism. In addition to evaluating the 
general finding of Chinese investors’ adaptation and investigating their 
potential threats, I choose these topics also because, despite the underlying 
theoretical and practical importance, their empirical analysis has been 
lacking. 
 V. AN IN-DEPTH CASE STUDY OF CHINESE INVESTORS’ 
ADAPTATION TO U.S. INSTITUTIONS 
The survey data discussed in Part IV portray most Chinese investors as 
inclined and able to adapt to U.S. institutions. The findings, however, are 
not definitive, especially given possible biases and the roughly balanced 
allocation of decision-making power between the Chinese investors and 
their U.S. managers. This Part V further explores the adaptation (or lack 
thereof), in the area of employment discrimination.  
The area of labor rights protection has fueled much doubt and 
resentment about Chinese business globalization. To better analyze the 
adaptation of Chinese investors, the study focuses on the subtle and 
complex issue of employment discrimination, as big gaps exist between the 
two countries in this particular area. In addition, employment protection is 
more germane to Chinese companies investing in the United States than 
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other controversial areas such as environmental protection or product safety 
because many Chinese investors operate in the service sector (See Figure 
4). Commercial banks, for instance, neither produce poisoned pet food nor 
pollute the rivers. But every Chinese investor in the United States, be it 
large or small, operates with a work force, so all should comply with U.S. 
rules prohibiting employment discrimination. Using the survey data, this 
subsection analyzes the adaptation (or lack thereof) of Chinese investors by 
investigating their employment practices. 
Before proceeding to the analysis, a brief introduction of Chinese labor 
law regime follows as a necessary background. The dramatic transformation 
of China from a Soviet-style planned economy to state capitalism with a 
rather dynamic market drove the legislation of employment-related statutes 
in China. In the former system most workers were employees of the state 
and employment-related disputes could be internally resolved by their work 
units.147 Once some were shoveled onto the market, their rights had to be 
protected by law. In response the Chinese legislature enacted a series of 
statutes for that purpose over time.  
The PRC Labor Law, effective in 1995, set forth the basic legal rights 
of employees. Subsequent enforcement of the statute, however, failed to 
meet the high expectations as rampant violations and abuses of labor rights 
persisted.148 Reacting to workforce discontent and to ease social tensions, 
the legislature passed additional employment-related laws.149 Employment 
Contract Law (2007), for example, reallocated the legal rights and 
obligations between employers and employees in favor of the latter.150 And 
non-judicial channels for resolving employment-related disputes were 
reinforced by the Law on the Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Dispute 
(2008).  
The legislature also enacted the Employment Promotion Law, which 
took effect in January 2008.151 The highly progressive statute provided 
formal legal basis for eliminating many types of employment discrimination 
in China. Articles 28 and 29 of the statute encourage the hiring of ethnic 
minorities and people with disabilities.152 Article 30 prohibits 
discrimination against pathogen carriers of infectious diseases such as HIV 
 
 147 Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55 
CALIF. L. REV. 1284, 1330 (1967). 
 148 Sean Cooney, Making Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in 
The People’s Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1050, 1060 (2007). 
 149 Virginia E. Happer Ho, From Contracts to Compliance? An Early Look at Implementation under 
China’s New Labor Legislation, 23 COLUM. J. OF ASIAN L. 35, 39 (2009). 
 150 Hilary K. Josephs, Measuring Progress Under China’s Labor Law: Goals, Processes, Outcomes, 
30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 373, 386 (2008). 
 151 Zonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiuye Cujin Fa (中华人民共和国就业促进法) [P.R.C. Law on 
Employment Promotion] (promulgated Aug. 30, 2007 by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
effective Jan 1, 2008), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-08/31/content_732597.htm. 
 152 Id. 
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or hepatitis B; Article 31 provides equal treatment for both urban workers 
and those migrating from rural areas.153  
Another important employment-related law in China is the Labor 
Union Law (2001). All Chinese unions belong to the All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions (ACFTU), and no independent union organizations are 
allowed under the law.154 Operating under the party’s direct leadership, the 
ACFTU has to keep a delicate balance between serving the interests of 
employers, which include powerful SOEs and multinational corporations 
critical to local and national GDP growth, and protecting the workers, 
whose dissatisfaction may lead to social discontent and instability. 
While the Chinese laws in the books, after years of active legislation, 
resemble those of a well-developed civil law country with sophisticated 
legal protection of labor rights,155 their enforcement in practice remains 
problematic.156 Despite the general demographic changes in China that 
resulted in the reversal of the huge labor surplus in the 1990s and caused a 
labor “famine,”157 various types of employment-related discrimination 
continue to plague the Chinese workplace.158 
Having been accustomed to such a domestic context of employment 
regulation, Chinese companies investing abroad may not prioritize the 
protection of workers’ rights in their host countries, as evidenced by 
anecdotal reports about labor abuses such as underpayment, long working 
hours, and discrimination committed by Chinese investors in developing 
countries.159 And it is not unreasonable to speculate that Chinese 
companies, when investing in the United States, will fall short of fully 
complying with the sophisticated legal regime for employment protection, 
especially the subtle and intricate rules prohibiting discrimination. Again, 
Japanese companies investing in the United States may serve as an 
illustrative example.  
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the United States was the top FDI 
destination for Japanese companies.160 Japan is known for its homogeneous 
 
 153 Id. 
 154 Ho, supra note 149, at 59. 
 155 OECD ranked China highly in terms of employment protection legislation. See OECD, OECD 
INDICATORS ON EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION (2013), http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/EPL-
data2013.xlsx.  
 156 Ho, supra note 149, at 39.  
 157 Id. at 88. 
 158 Timothy Webster, Ambivalence and Activism: Employment Discrimination in China, 44 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 643, 660–62 (2011). 
 159 See, e.g., Simon Clark et al., China Lets Child Workers Die Digging in Congo Mines for Copper, 
BLOOMBERG (July 22, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid= 
aW8xVLQ4Xhr8. 
 160 For instance, in 1991 43% of all Japanese outflow investment ended in the U.S. See Schon 
Beechler & Zhuang Yang John, The Transfer of Japanese-Style Management to American Subsidiaries: 
Contingencies, Constraints, and Competencies, 25 J. INT’L. BUS. STUD. 467, 468 (1994). 
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culture that to a certain extent tolerates discrimination based on gender, age, 
nationality and race.161 Arriving from such a cultural and business 
environment, Japanese companies investing in the United States were 
frequently sued by employees.162 In response to the clash between their 
traditional employment practice and the U.S. laws against discrimination, 
Japanese firms had adopted a variety of tactics, from taking advantage of 
treaty exemptions163 to using secretive communication code to screen job 
applicants according to their race, age, and national origin.164 
Now enter the Chinese investors. Will the Chinese companies bring to 
the United States the substandard employment practices and various forms 
of discrimination they have been accustomed to while operating in China? 
Before analyzing the survey results pertinent to this question, it is important 
to note that the U.S. legal context in which Chinese investors operate varies 
from the one for Japanese companies. Of the most importance for 
employment discrimination is the lack of a bilateral treaty similar to the 
Japan-U.S. Friendship Commerce and Navigation Treaty, which contains a 
provision granting Japanese companies investing in the United States great 
autonomy in filling executive positions.165  
Such a favorable treaty does not exist between the United States and 
China. Thus, all Chinese companies investing in the United States, 
regardless of their form, are bound by the entire U.S. legal framework for 
employment protection. Given the general findings in Part IV, i.e., Chinese 
investors’ positive perceptions of the U.S. systems, their commercial 
motives, the heavy reliance on local talent and U.S. professionals, one may 
reasonably expect Chinese investors to adapt quickly to the host country 
environment in terms of their employment practices.166 As noted below, the 
survey findings largely confirm this expectation.  
According to the survey, high labor cost tops the list of challenges 
faced by Chinese investors. Due to the development gap between the two 
countries, U.S. salaries are much higher than the salaries of Chinese 
 
 161 Linda N. Edwards, Equal Employment Opportunity in Japan: A View from the West, 41 IND. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 240 (1988). 
 162 John M. Mezias, Identifying Liabilities of Foreignness and Strategies to Minimize their Effects: 
The Case of Labor Lawsuit Judgments in the United States, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 229, 239–40 
(2002). 
 163 Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 179 (U.S. 1982). 
 164 Employment Discrimination by Japanese-Owned Companies in the United States: Before the 
Subcomm. On Employment and Housing of the H. Comm. On Government Operations, 102nd Cong. 7–9 
(1992) (statement of Paul Schmidtberger, former employee, Recruit U.S.A.). 
 165 See, e.g., Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 457 U.S. at 181 (quoting Article VIII(1) of the treaty, which 
provides that “companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other 
party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other 
specialists of their choice.” Yet “US subsidiaries of Japanese companies do not enjoy the treaty 
benefits”). 
 166 See supra Part IV. 
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workers. For those Chinese firms that have hired local workers, the top 
three reasons are “for gaining access to U.S. market,” “for communicating 
with customers,” and “general knowledge of U.S. culture and market.” 
Given the market-seeking objective of most Chinese investors (see Figure 
8) it is rational to rely heavily on local talent, despite the concern of higher 
cost. 
As to the profiles of the U.S. employees, only 14% reported to hire 
mainly Chinese Americans; the vast majority 85% reported a U.S. 
workforce of racial and ethnic diversity. The Chinese investors also 
reported to be mostly satisfied with the performance of their U.S. 
employees. Only 5% of the respondents were less satisfied, compared to 
50% who were satisfied, and 10% who were very satisfied. 18% of the 
respondents expressed a neutral view. These figures are comparable to the 
satisfaction level for employees expatriated from China, which indicates 
that Chinese investors will likely increase the hiring of local employees as 
the cost of Chinese labor continues to rise. The high satisfaction with the 
diverse U.S. workforce also suggests Chinese firms in the United States are 
less prone to discrimination on race, ethnicity or national origin.  
There also exists more direct evidence in support of this conclusion. 
Since it is impractical to ask explicitly whether the respondents engage in 
employment discrimination, the survey instead inquired into the preventive 
measures taken by the Chinese investors. 167 Only 11% of the respondents 
reported to have not taken any measure to prevent employment 
discrimination. 19% had orally advised their employees against 
discrimination. 43% of the respondents adopted formal internal rules 
against discrimination and 27% not only had formal rules, but also provided 
training to their employees preventing employment discrimination, which is 
comparable to the percentage reported in a survey of American 
organizations.168  
While we cannot observe directly the extent of discrimination in the 
Chinese-invested firms, survey results indicate that employment 
discrimination has not been a major issue. 83% of the respondents reported 
to have received no employee complaint about discrimination. 8% reported 
to have handled such complaints through settlement. Only 4% had litigated 
discrimination complaints from employees.169 
 
 167 See supra Part IV. 
 168 31% of the surveyed American companies reported to have provided diversity training in 2012. 
See SOC’Y HUM. RES. MGMT., SHRM SURVEY FINDINGS: DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION 17 (2014), 
http://www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/shrm/shrm-2013-survey-findings-diversity-inclusion-v5-
34003340/2. Among the American organizations with fewer than 500 employees, only 21% reported to 
have provided diversity training in 2012. Id. at 8. Given that few Chinese investors in the U.S. have a 
staff of more than 500 employees, we can infer that a Chinese company investing in the U.S. is more 
likely than an American organization to offer training preventing employment discrimination. 
 169 One may suspect underreporting. It is possible, but should not be a serious problem given the 
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In sum, general data reported in Part IV suggest that Chinese 
companies investing in the United States are driven by commercial 
incentives, perceive positively of the U.S. institutions, and rely heavily on 
local and professional talent. Thus, they should be adaptive to the host 
country’s legal and regulatory systems. This Part VI presents further 
empirical support to the argument. Survey data about employment practices 
indicate that, despite anecdotal reports critical of Chinese outward investors 
for violating labor rights in certain developing countries, those investing in 
the United States have adapted relatively well to the sophisticated U.S. legal 
and regulatory environment for employee protection.170 
 VI. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF TWO POTENTIAL THREATS OF 
CHINESE BUSINESS EXPANSION 
Even if empirically affirmed, however, the general tendency of 
adaptation shall not obscure the potential threats from deviant cases or 
groups of outliers. Thus, this article will also analyze the adequacy of extant 
U.S. institutions to protect against the risk of Chinese investment. 
Furthermore, Part VI.B resumes the discussion of the Chinese model of 
state capitalism and, drawing on the unique survey data, questions the claim 
that it may pose formidable challenges to the U.S. variant of capitalism.  
 A. The CFIUS Review and the Ralls Decision 
This subsection discusses the legal framework for the CFIUS review 
process and its recent development subsequent to the D.C. Circuit decision 
in Ralls v. CFIUS, which held the committee’s treatment of a Chinese 
investment case violated the investor’s constitutional right to due process.171 
As will be illustrated, the CFIUS review has over time been strengthened 
and despite the setback in Ralls, will remain a powerful institution to 
prevent and mitigate threats to U.S. national security by Chinese investors 
that are inadequately addressed by other laws.  
Originally created in 1975 by an executive order, CFIUS was initially 
charged with monitoring the impact of foreign investment in the United 
States and coordinating relevant government policies.172 In response to the 
surge of FDI from Japan and other foreign countries, Congress enacted the 
“Exon-Florio Amendment” in 1988 to Title VII of the Defense Production 
Act of 1950, which empowered CFIUS to assist the President in reviewing 
 
anonymity of the survey and the Association’s independent third-party status. 
 170 The adaptation may also be partially attributable to the development gap between China and the 
U.S. and lack of favorable treaty exemptions. 
 171 Ralls Corp. v. CFIUS, 758 F.3d 296, 319 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 172 Georgiev, supra note 83, at 126. 
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and blocking foreign investment considered to pose national security 
threats.173 CFIUS, led by the Department of Treasury, consists of nine 
member agencies and invites several others to observe.174 Later, a few high-
profile acquisition attempts by foreign investors led to the passage of the 
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA), which 
amended and codified the CFIUS review process to provide more 
transparency and Congressional oversight.175 
Filing for CFIUS review is voluntary.176 Once a filing is completed, 
CFIUS has thirty days to review and approve the investment or otherwise 
initiate a forty-five day investigation.177 Any CFIUS agency can initiate the 
investigation.178 At the expiration of the forty-five day period, unresolved 
issues will be submitted to the President, who must either approve or block 
the transaction within fifteen days.179 The filing party may withdraw its case 
or re-file, which restarts the clock. CFIUS review is limited to covered 
transactions, which broadly refer to “any merger, acquisition, or takeover . . 
. by or with any foreign person which could result in foreign control of any 
person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.”180 
The law fails to clearly define “national security,” but provides a non-
exhaustive list of factors for making that determination, including 
investment that impacts “domestic production needed for . . . national 
defense,” “Untied States critical technologies,” “long-term requirements for 
. . . critical resources,” and “critical infrastructure.”181 Some had proposed 
to include “economic security” to the jurisdiction of CFIUS, but the term 
did not find its way into the statute or subsequent regulations.182 Although 
the filing is voluntary, CFIUS constitutes a powerful tool to regulate foreign 
investment in the United States as it can order divestiture of U.S. assets 
whenever a threat to national security is determined.183 In addition, FINSA 
 
 173 Marc Greidinger, The Exon-Florio Amendment: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 6 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 111, 112–14 (1991). 
 174 Composition of CFIUS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-members.aspx. 
 175 Margaret Merrill, Overcoming CFIUS Jitters: A Practical Guide for Understanding the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 6 (2011). 
 176 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(a) (2011). 
 177 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.502–505 (2011); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(2)(C) (2006). 
 178 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 179 31 C.F.R. § 800.506(b)(l)–(3) (2011); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (2006). 
 180 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(3) (2006). 
 181 Id. § 2170(f). 
 182 Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 70702, 70705 (Nov. 21, 2008) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/CFIUS-Final-Regulations-new.pdf (indicating § 
800.801 was drafted narrowly in line with CFIUS’s intent to focus “on genuine national security 
concerns alone, not broader economic or other national interests.”). 
 183 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(3) (2006). 
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mandates an investigation of any foreign acquisitions of U.S. assets if such 
acquisition will result in foreign government control.184 Furthermore, 
adding to the uncertainties of foreign investment in the United States, 
CFIUS is not time-barred from opening a review of a covered 
transaction,185 and the actions and findings of the President through CFIUS 
review are not subject to judicial review.186 
From 2008 to 2012, 538 notices were filed,187 mostly by companies 
from countries that are considered U.S. allies. The U.K. topped the ranking 
of source countries until 2012, when it was overtaken by China (See Figure 
11.) CFIUS rarely rejected properly notified transactions, though it had 
persuaded some foreign investors to voluntary withdraw from their 
proposed investment.188 The regime is of particular relevance to Chinese 
investors as a higher percentage of Chinese companies are state controlled, 
and FINSA mandates CFIUS investigations of acquisitions resulting in 
foreign government control.189 
The CFIUS review process and its outcome is shrouded in 
uncertainties,190 yet for decades no foreign investor had challenged a CFIUS 
action in court, probably because of the relatively loose enforcement prior 
to FINSA,191 the underlying national security nature of the process, and the 
statutory provision clearly constraining judicial review.192 That record, 
however, was recently shattered by a Chinese investor. 
  
 
 184 Id. § 2170(b)(1)(B). 
 185 Andreas Heinemann, Government Control of Cross-Border M&A: Legitimate Regulation Or 
Protectionism? 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 843, 844 (2012). 
 186 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (2006). 
 187 Covered Transactions, Withdrawals, and Presidential Decisions 2008–2012, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-
investment/Documents/CFIUS%20Stats%202008-2012.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
 188 Id. 
 189 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(B) (2006). 
 190 See, e.g., Christopher M. Tipler, Defining ‘National Security’: Resolving Ambiguity in the CFIUS 
Regulations, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1223, 1243 (2014); Joshua C. Zive, Unreasonable Delays: CFIUS 
Reviews of Energy Transactions, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 169, 169 (2013). 
 191 David Zaring, CFIUS As Congressional Notification Service, 83 S.C. L. REV. 81, 87 (2009). 
 192 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (2006). 
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Figure 11: Number of Covered Transactions by Acquirer Home Country 
(2006–2013) 
Data source: Annual Reports to Congress (2008–2015) by Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-reports.aspx 
 
In March 2012, Ralls Corporation, a U.S. company owned by two 
Chinese nationals, purchased four American companies with the intent to 
develop windfarms in north-central Oregon.193 The purchased sites are 
located in and around the “region of a restricted airspace and bombing zone 
maintained by the United States Navy.”194 After reviewing Ralls’s filing 
made post to the transaction at the request of the Defense Department, 
CFIUS determined that the acquisition threatened national security and 
issued interim mitigation orders restricting Ralls’s access to, and preventing 
further construction at, the windfarm sites pending the President’s final 
decision.195 The matter was then submitted to President Obama, who 
concurred that the transaction posed a national security threat and issued an 
order blocking the transaction and requiring Ralls, among others, to divest 
from the American companies.196  
Throughout the CFIUS review process, Ralls received no explanation 
as to the factual basis of the determination and was provided no opportunity 
to rebut any evidence against it.197 In response to the CFIUS actions, Ralls 
filed a lawsuit claiming, inter alia, the violation by CFIUS of its due process 
 
 193 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 194 Id. at 304. 
 195 Id. at 302. 
 196 Id. at 306. 
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right under the Fifth Amendment.198 The district court initially dismissed 
most of Ralls’s claims as moot or for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.199 
Later the due process claim was also dismissed for failure to state a 
claim.200 Ralls appealed, and the D.C. Circuit surprisingly reversed.201  
The D.C. Circuit began by applying the “clear-and-convincing 
evidence” standard to avail itself of jurisdiction to review the constitutional 
due process claims and observed that the statutory bar under the Defense 
Production Act of 1950 applied only to the President’s determinations, not 
the constitutionality of the process by which they are reached.202 Moreover, 
it rejected the appellee’s argument that Ralls’s procedural due process claim 
was a nonjusticiable political question as the claim did not “encroach on the 
prerogative of the political branches,” “did not require the exercise of non-
judicial discretion,” and was “susceptible to judicially manageable 
standards.”203 After the review, the D.C. Circuit found Ralls was denied due 
process as it was neither informed of the nature of the national security 
concern with the acquisitions or the evidence on which the determination 
was based, nor allowed an opportunity to rebut the evidence.204 
In post-brief proceedings the government also raised the defense of 
executive privilege, which the circuit court did not have a chance to fully 
address.205 The D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the district court with 
instructions that Ralls be provided access to the unclassified evidence on 
which the President relied and an opportunity to respond thereto.206 It also 
left the validity of the government’s executive privilege defense to the 
lower court’s determination.207  
Ralls was the first lawsuit in which a foreign investor challenged the 
CFIUS process, and the outcome was unexpected.208 The setback, however, 
will not significantly weaken the institutional tool in protecting against any 
potential threat to U.S. national security of foreign investment through asset 
 
 198 Id. at 315. 
 199 Id. at 306. 
 200 Id. at 307. 
 201 Id. at 309 
 202 Id. at 308–11. 
 203 Id. at 307–13. 
 204 Id. at 325. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Liu Jie, News Analysis: Why U.S. Court Sides with Chinese Company in Dispute with Obama?, 
XINHUA NEWS (July 21, 2014, 2:25 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-
07/21/c_133499513.htm. The ruling is surprising even to experienced practitioners in the U.S. See, e.g., 
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Ralls v. CFIUS: D.C. Circuit Explains Constitutional Due Process 
Requirements During CFIUS Review, at 4 (July 17, 2014), 
http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Ralls_v_CFIUS_DC_Circuit_Explains
_Constitutional_Due_Process_Requirements.pdf. 
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First, if it chooses to, the government may succeed in shielding much 
of CFIUS review information from disclosure with executive privilege in 
the future. Though somewhat controversial due to absence in the 
Constitution,209 executive privilege—as “the right of the President and high-
level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the 
courts, and ultimately the public”—has been a “well-established 
constitutional power with a longstanding history in American 
government.”210 While several major issues concerning the exercise of the 
privilege and its recognition remain unresolved, and historically its use 
varied under different presidencies, “the presumption in favor of the 
privilege is the strongest in national security or foreign policy.”211 The 
district court on remand drew a timeline for CFIUS to provide Ralls with 
access to relevant unclassified materials or otherwise assert executive 
privilege.212 CFIUS handed over more than 3,000 pages of documents to 
Ralls, claiming privilege over just a few. The two parties subsequently 
decided to settle, leaving the issue unresolved.213  
Moreover, the substantial compliance of CFIUS with the court ruling 
will unlikely overburden the agency in the future as disclosure is required 
only for unclassified information.214 CFIUS may reach the same decision by 
relying on allegedly classified information. So even though the CFIUS 
process may be modified in accordance with the Ralls decision by 
incorporating certain procedural guarantees of the foreign investors’ due 
process rights, the institution retains wide latitude in screening, altering, and 
blocking proposed acquisitions of U.S. assets by foreign investors. 
The survey results show that 55% of the respondents had never 
considered the issue of CFIUS review.215 23% had considered it but 
determined that the law would not apply to their transactions. 12% had filed 
the notices and 10% had skipped the filing for low perceived risk. The data 
is largely consistent with what is expected from profit-driven rational 
foreign investors. Though powerful, CFIUS review applies only to 
 
 209 Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modern Presidents: In Nixon’s Shadow, 83 MINN. L. 
REV. 1069, 1069 (1999). 
 210 Id.  
 211 MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (2010) 
 212 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177868, 36 Int’l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) 1010 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2014) 
 213 Moreover, because of the settlement, the court did not have a chance to pass on the legality of 
CFIUS interim orders. 
 214 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 215 Caution should be taken with regard to these findings due to the missing data. It is likely that 
most of those who refused to answer this question never considered CFIUS, which would result in a 
percentage higher than 55%.  
36_1_3_LI SUPERFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/16 3:28 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 36:143 (2016) 
194 
acquisition of U.S. assets, not greenfield investments.216 Since only 42% of 
the responding investors reported to enter the U.S. market through 
acquisitions, the majority would have no reason to consider filing a CFIUS 
notice. Those that had considered the issue responded to the perceived risk. 
The CFIUS notice is voluntary, and the vast majority of the filings 
(338/538) are approved without investigation,217 implying their low national 
security risk. It is, therefore, sensible to skip the filing in cases where an 
easy approval is expected. Consistent with the general findings of 
adaptation in the previous section, Chinese investors relied on U.S. lawyers 
in dealing with CFIUS. 57% of the respondents reported to have consulted 
legal counsel, and 95% had adopted the legal advice.  
In sum, despite its recent loss in court, CFIUS remains a powerful tool 
to protect against national security threats from Chinese investments. And 
consistent with the general findings from the survey, Chinese investors 
react rationally and relied on the assistance of U.S. lawyers in complying 
with the CFIUS rules. 
 B. The Phantom Menace of State Capitalism with Chinese 
Characteristics 
Another concern with Chinese investment in the United States is the 
unique state-business relationships in China that allegedly give the Chinese 
companies an unfair edge over their American competitors, which the U.S. 
legal system may not adequately handle.218 As discussed earlier, China 
adopts what is known as a specific variant of capitalism, i.e. state 
capitalism, characterized by heavy state intervention in business sectors and 
active promotion of business development using state resources.219  
The Chinese economy is undergoing a dramatic transformation and the 
state-business relationships are in a state of flux.220 Thus, a clear definition 
of the Chinese model of capitalism remains at best tentative, and scholars 
still debate as to the core elements of the concept.221 That being said, a few 
features patently distinguish the Chinese state-business relationships from 
 
 216 Greenfield investments are defined as “start-up investment in new facilities.” Bruce Kogut & 
Harbir Singh, The Effect of National Culture on the Choice of Entry Mode, 19 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 411, 
412 (1988). 
 217 The number of withdrawn notices, 32, is subtracted from the total number of notices to make the 
calculation, assuming those investments posed national security threat. 
 218 Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National) Champions: Understanding the 
Mechanism of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 757 (2013). 
 219 See generally ALDO MUSACCHIO & SERGIO LAZZARINI, REINVENTING STATE CAPITALISM: 
LEVIATHAN IN BUSINESS, BRAZIL AND BEYOND (2014). 
 220 Kellee Tsai, Capitalists without a Class: Political Diversity among Private Entrepreneurs in 
China, 38 COMP. POL. STUD. 1130, 1138 (2005). 
 221 For example, a recent debate is about the propriety of focusing too much on SOEs for defining 
state capitalism. See Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 49. 
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those of the United States. First, the state created and nurtured a group of 
“truly global Chinese companies that could compete with the large 
multinational companies that dominated global production chains.”222 
Following the Japanese Keiretsu model, these state-owned national 
champions “were allowed to establish their own financial companies.”223 To 
strengthen corporate governance and efficiency of these SOEs, the state 
engaged in “institutional outsourcing,”224 having many of them listed on 
stock exchanges abroad.225  
Second, the tie is much closer, especially between the state and the 
Chinese SOEs. Senior managers of Chinese SOEs hold administrative ranks 
in the government’s nomenklatura at various levels.226 To align the interests 
of SOE managers and those of the ruling elite, a sophisticated evaluation 
system was established to supervise and incentivize the managers to 
achieve the policy objectives of the state.227 For instance, top managers of 
central SOEs, some of which are ranked as vice-ministers, may be further 
promoted to positions with the rank of minister or higher.228 Promotion-
oriented SOE managers, therefore, tend to serve the interests of the state 
with greater enthusiasm.229 
To many private Chinese companies connections with the state are of 
utmost importance, as they need the protection of the state to ensure the 
security of their investment.230 Ties with government officials serve as a 
substitute for formal institutions such as an effective and independent 
judiciary.231 Given this heavy reliance on the state, private companies, 
especially those owned by red capitalists, are normally loyal followers of 
state policies.232 
The dependence, however, is mutual, though in a highly tilted manner. 
The state attempts to maintain its legitimacy and control over the economy 
by co-opting leaders in the private sector.233 Successful business people 
were invited to join the ruling elite and wield political influence.234 To a 
 
 222 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Politics and Business Group Formation in China: The Party in Control?, 
211 THE CHINA Q. 624, 628 (2012). 
 223 Id. 
 224 STEINFELD, supra note 5, 24–25. 
 225 Id. at 32. 
 226 Brødsgaard, supra note 222, at 626–27. 
 227 Naughton, China’s Distinctive System: Can it be a Model for Others?, supra note 87, at 452–53. 
 228 Li, State-Owned Enterprises in the Current Regime of Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 70, 
at 380. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Xin & Pearce, supra note 135, at 1654. 
 231 Id. 
 232 See generally Tsai, supra note 220, at 1130. 
 233 See generally BRUCE J. DICKSON, WEALTH INTO POWER: THE COMMUNIST PARTY’S EMBRACE 
OF CHINA’S PRIVATE SECTOR (2008). 
 234 Kellee S. Tsai, Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China, 59 
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certain extent, the mutual dependence also reflects state capture.235 Private 
companies with abundant resources can influence policy making through 
various formal and informal channels such as bribery and lobbying.236 
While private lobbying to impact public policy making is universal, in 
China it results in close and personal mutual dependence due to the lack of 
transparency and institutional checks. 
Because of the close state-business relations, Chinese companies may 
benefit from all the public resources commanded by the government,237 
which has been viewed as a potential threat to American economy.238 This 
is not the first time a variable form of capitalism has been perceived as 
threatening the fundamentals of the U.S. system. As noted earlier, FDI from 
Japan and the anxiety it instilled in Congress led to the Exon-Florio 
Amendment.239 Yet over time the U.S. model proved more resilient and the 
fear for Japanese companies gradually faded. Does the current alarm about 
state capitalism with Chinese characteristics contain anything 
unprecedented that amounts to a credible threat, or is it simply the second 
round of unnecessary collective panic?  
For the following reasons, I contend the Chinese model of state 
capitalism in its current form will unlikely pose an existential threat to U.S. 
institutions through investment by Chinese companies. While the label of 
Japan, Inc. lost much of its substantive meaning in the 1980s as Japanese 
policy making was gradually fragmented,240 Chinese control over the 
market and the business sector is by no means more integrated or coherent. 
The 140,000 Chinese SOEs are subject to control and leadership of 
governments at several different administrative levels by a great variety of 
agencies.241 Even SASAC, the central agency charged with exercising the 
shareholder rights of the central government in some of the largest SOEs, 
has to share its power with the SOEs.242  
And the state itself is highly fragmented. Power is contested for among 
different factions across subject areas and patronage networks. Different 
government agencies and ministries, often with diverging interests or policy 
 
WORLD POLITICS 116, 132–33 (2006). 
 235 Tsai, supra note 220, at 1136. 
 236 Guosheng Deng & Scott Kennedy, Big Business and Industry Association Lobbying in China: 
The Paradox of Contrasting Styles, 63 CHINA J. 101, 111–14 (2010). 
 237 For a detailed description of measures taken by the Chinese government to promote outbound 
investment, see Yadong Luo et al., How Emerging Market Governments Promote Outward FDI: 
Experience from China, 45 J. OF WORLD BUS. 68, 75–76 (2010). 
 238 SZAMOSSZEGI, supra note 20, at ix. 
 239 David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional Notification Service, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 81, 92 (2009). 
 240 See generally T. J. Pempel, The Unbundling of “Japan, Inc.”: The Changing Dynamics of 
Japanese Policy Formation, 13 J. OF JAPANESE STUD. 271 (1987). 
 241 Li, State-Owned Enterprises in the Current Regime of Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 70, 
at 401. 
 242 Brødsgaard, supra note 222, at 630–31. 
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goals, contend with each other over the control and administration of 
business groups.243 In addition, the extent to which the state can effectively 
control the SOEs is determined by multiple factors including promotion 
probability, the political stature of the top SOE leaders, the salience and 
openness of the sector in which the SOEs operate, and the percentage and 
density of state ownership.244 Given these structural differences, the 
Chinese government simply cannot design or effectively implement the 
same type of long-term cross-sector growth strategies as the Japanese 
government agencies allegedly did in the 1980s and early 1990s.245  
Moreover, due to the way officials are evaluated, promotion-oriented 
top executives of Chinese SOEs tend to make short-term cost-benefit 
analyses.246 They tend to concentrate on investments that can generate 
substantial returns before the end of their current terms or before they are 
transferred to another post.247 Such short-term behavior, which is 
individually rational in the institutional context of the SOEs, is not 
compatible with systemic implementation of long-term economic policies. 
Thus, it is unlikely that Chinese companies investing in the U.S. will 
coordinate and tolerate short-term losses in the U.S. market to gain market 
dominance over the long run.  
In addition, after years of reforms of the corporate governance for 
SOEs, most of the managers assuming the dual roles of business executive 
and party official “increasingly prioritize their economic identities over 
their political ones, representing corporate interests.”248 Profitability of 
SOEs was set as a key criterion to evaluate the performance of their 
managers, and those whose investment decisions led to substantial losses 
were penalized.249 Furthermore, the Chinese SOEs, though large by size, 
generate profits mainly from their oligopolistic positions in the Chinese 
market, a privilege they do not enjoy outside China.  
As to large and competitive private companies in China that are 
viewed by some as an important component of Chinese state capitalism,250 
 
 243 Id. at 631; Margaret M. Pearson, The Business of Governing Business in China: Institutions and 
Norms of the Emerging Regulatory State, 57 WORLD POL. 296, 308–09 (2005); Chih-shian Liou, 
Bureaucratic Politics and Overseas Investment by Chinese State-Owned Oil Companies: Illusory 
Champions, 49 ASIAN SURV. 670, 685 (2009). 
 244 Li, supra note 70, at 395. 
 245 Yang Jiang, Red Trojan Horses? A New Look at Chinese SOEs’ Outward Investment, 2 J. OF 
CHINA & INT’L REL. 1, 18–19 (2014). 
 246 See generally Dan Haglund, In it for the Long Term? Governance and Learning among Chinese 
Investors in Zambia’s Copper Sector, 199 THE CHINA Q. 627 (2009). 
 247 Victor Shih, Tools of Survival: Sovereign Wealth Funds in Singapore and China, 14 
GEOPOLITICS 328, 335 (2009). 
 248 Liou, Bureaucratic Politics and Overseas Investment by Chinese State-Owned Oil Companies: 
Illusory Champions, supra note 243, at 677. 
 249 Jiang, supra note 245, at 11. 
 250 Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 49. 
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their ties to the Chinese government are also segmented. Diversity in 
backgrounds and preferences of Chinese entrepreneurs leads to varied 
responses to state policies.251 While those benefiting from political 
connections are generally “loyally acceptant” of the state rules and policies, 
those without tend to be more assertive of their own interests.252 Thus, it is 
unlikely that private Chinese companies investing in the U.S. would 
constitute a homogeneous group of agents zealously doing the bids of the 
Chinese government.  
In sum, because power is fragmented within the political structure, the 
state-business ties are segmented, and the government control is incapable 
of effectively reaching outside the national border, the concept of a 
monolithic and omnipotent Chinese state dictating overseas investment 
does not well reflect the reality. The survey results bear out this non-threat 
argument. As discussed earlier, the Chinese government’s “go global” 
policy did not appear to have played a direct and essential role in the actual 
investment decisions of Chinese companies.253 And, the profits of Chinese 
investors in the U.S. do not deviate from reasonable levels. 45% of the 
respondents broke even in 2013. 24% made a profit, and 32% reported a 
loss. As noted earlier, 6% reported that U.S. business profits were much 
higher than their global profit level. 19% reported to be slightly higher. 
39% saw their U.S. profit to be on par with their global profit. 19% reported 
lower profit in the United States than globally, and 17% found the profit 
level in the United States to be much lower than the global level. From the 
data, we cannot detect any sign of extraordinary profits, which would 
suggest high competitiveness of Chinese businesses in the U.S. market, or 
of unreasonably high losses, which would indicate home state intervention 
or subsidy. 
To evaluate the potential threat from Chinese business expansion 
bankrolled by cash-rich state-owned banks in China,254 the survey inquired 
about the financing of Chinese FDI in the U.S. Most Chinese investors 
(seventy-two respondents made this selection) used their own earnings to 
invest in the United States,255 and thirty-two borrowed from Chinese state-
owned banks. Sixteen respondents received loans from non-state owned 
banks to finance the investment in the United States; eight respondents 
 
 251 Tsai, supra note 220, at 1146. 
 252 Id. 
 253 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 254 Ken Miller, Coping with China’s Financial Power: Beijing’s Financial Foreign Policy, 89 
FOREIGN AFF. 96 (2010); Luo et al., supra note 237, at 75. For an example of global acquisition by a 
Chinese SOE using generous loans from Chinese state-owned banks, see Shujie Yao & Dylan 
Sutherland, Chinalco and Rio Tinto: A Long March for China’s National Champions, 199 THE CHINA 
Q. 829, 832 (2009). 
 255 This adds empirical support to the argument drawn from a recent case study. Jiang, supra note 
245, at 14. 
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relied on stock issuance in China, and ten raised capital by issuing securities 
outside China. Only six respondents borrowed from Chinese individuals 
and companies. 
 
Figure 12: Source of Funding for FDI 
 
Though the vast majority of the respondents relied on their own 
earnings to invest in the United States, and borrowing from state-owned 
banks appear to play a secondary role, the overt self-reliance may actually 
reflect Chinese government support. Chinese government policies towards 
national champions were such that their parents could retain 90% the 
profits,256 so most used them for reinvestment.257 Such a favorable policy, 
however, is undergoing significant modification and recent rules had set a 
target for collecting SOEs’ earnings and profits as a source of government 
revenue.258 
To address this issue, the respondents were asked to compare 
 
 256 Guoqi Lirun Shangjiao Xianzhuang: Wulei Bili Zuigao 20%, 90% Bei Fanhuan 
(国企利润上缴现状：五类比例最高20% 90%被返还) [Current Situation of SOE Profits Remission: 
Five Categories with Highest Rate of 20%, 90% Returned], CAIJING (财经) (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20131115/170417338178.shtml (last visited Sep. 20, 2014). 
 257 Brødsgaard, supra note 222, at 632. 
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borrowing in the United States with borrowing in China. Though major 
banks in China are all state-owned, they have prioritized profitability in the 
lending practice. Some have argued that serving the policy interests of the 
state is more a coincidence than the objective of credit issuance to SOEs or 
private national champions investing overseas.259 49% of the respondents 
considered financing in the United States to be of the same difficulty level 
as in China. 23% thought it more difficult in the United States and 27% 
found it to be easier. The results suggest that Chinese companies do not 
enjoy significant comparative advantages from financing by Chinese policy 
banks in making their U.S. investments.260  
The fragmentation of state authority also vitiates its capacity to 
coordinate the business activities of Chinese companies investing abroad.261 
The survey results suggest weak ties or lack of confidence or trust between 
the Chinese government and Chinese investors in the United States When 
asked in a multiple choice question what to do if facing unfair competition 
in the United States, only sixteen intended to seek the assistance of relevant 
Chinese authorities, while forty-one would litigate, twenty-eight would 
negotiate directly with the competitors, and twenty-seven would solicit the 
help of business associations. Even the U.S. governments appeared more 
helpful, as twenty-three would petition for its intervention. 
When asked what they would do if treated unfairly by the U.S. 
government, the most popular choice was to consult a lawyer and follow the 
legal advice (sixty-four). That was followed, by a large margin, by 
“litigating in a US court” (thirty-five), which tied with “seeking the 
assistance of the Chinese government” (thirty-five). Petitioning to relevant 
U.S. government departments came in as the next popular choice (thirty-
two). The minor difference between the two choices indicates the lack of 




 259 E.g., Jiang, supra note 245, at 14; Erica Downs, Inside China, Inc: China Development Bank’s 
Cross-Border Energy Deals, BROOKINGS INST. PAPER (Dec. 9, 2011), 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/12/09-china-development-bank-downs. 
 260 A caveat is that Chinese SOEs investing in the U.S. may be financed in the U.S. by Chinese state 
banks that have set up operation in the U.S. For example, by May 2015 the Bank of China’s New York 
branch had provided $7.4 billion loans to Chinese companies investing in the U.S. Zhong Yixing 
(钟忆行), Zhongguo Yinhang: Jiaqi Zhongmei Maoyi de Qiaoliang 
(中国银行：架起中美经贸往来桥梁) [Bank of China: A Bridge for Sino-US Trade and Business], 
PEOPLE’S DAILY (Sept. 25, 2015), http://money.people.com.cn/stock/n/2015/0925/c67815-
27633101.html. 
 261 Chih-shian Liou, Rent-Seeking at Home, Capturing Market Share Abroad: The Domestic 
Determinants of the Transnationalization of China State Construction Engineering Corporation, 54 
WORLD DEV. 220, 228 (2014). 
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In sum, despite the apparent state dominance over the market and 
Chinese companies, the Chinese government lacks requisite capacity to 
coordinate long-term and coherent investment strategies in the United 
States. Therefore, Chinese investors in the United States are unlikely loyal 
agents of formidable state capitalism dedicated to or capable of challenging 
U.S. business or the free-market economy. To be sure, some U.S. 
companies will face mounting competition from expanding private Chinese 
companies that are able to take advantage of cheap labor at home, but U.S. 
consumers will ultimately benefit from the intensified competition. 
Part VII analyzes in more detail the two potential threats from Chinese 
companies investing in the United States, i.e., the threat to national security 
and the threat to free market capitalism. Combining the unique survey data 
with institutional analysis, the Section demonstrates that the CFIUS review 
process remains a powerful mechanism to guard against foreign investment 
that potentially threatens U.S. national security, and that the Chinese model 
of state capitalism will not likely triumph in battles with the U.S. variant of 
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 VII. THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Based on the first ever comprehensive survey of Chinese companies 
investing in the United States, this paper fills major gaps in the extant 
literature and debate about the rise of China, its global business expansion, 
and the impact on U.S. legal and political systems. According to the survey 
findings, Chinese investors are mostly rational and motivated by strategic 
business concerns,262 echoing the argument that “the emergence of SOEs’ 
commercial interests from the process of corporatization has transformed 
the firms into market players.”263 Thus, existing theories of FDI that are 
predicated on the assumption of rational actors, once modified to 
incorporate major Chinese institutional and cultural characteristics, will 
likely provide good analytical tools for understanding the actions of 
Chinese investors in the United States.  
In addition, the survey findings suggest that the fear of recalcitrant 
Chinese investors threatening U.S. institutions lacks solid factual basis. 
Commercially-motivated Chinese investors hold very positive views about 
U.S. business, legal, and political systems and, despite their concerns with 
high cost, rely heavily on professionals and local employees. As a result, 
most large Chinese investors willingly adapt to the host country 
environment and behave in ways similar to their U.S. competitors. In other 
words, the investors are mostly “playing our game” by the established rules.  
Moreover, the finding of business rationality in China’s outbound 
investment also sheds light on the varying motivations and actions of 
Chinese investors in different countries. In places of weak state institutions, 
Chinese investors, commercially motivated and highly adaptive, will more 
likely “export their Chinese problems” by retaining practices such as 
disregarding environmental regulations, violating labor rights, and bribing 
local officials.264 By comparison, in countries with a sophisticated and 
effective legal system and transparent governance, commercially-motivated 
Chinese investors generally go after know-how, technology, market, and 
global brand, and will act like their local competitors.265  
 
 262 This is consistent with the finding that Chinese companies, state-owned or private, are generally 
market seekers. E.g., Ramasamy et al., supra note 45, at 24; Liou, supra note 243, at 679; Boateng et al., 
supra note 110, at 259. 
 263 Liou, supra note 261, at 221. 
 264 Barry Sautman & Yan Hairong, Bashing ‘the Chinese’: Contextualizing Zambia’s Collum Coal 
Mine Shooting, 23 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 1073, 1075–78 (2014). 
 265 Business scholars have found Chinese investors drawn to large markets of developed countries, 
and countries with poor institutions but large nature resources. Kolstad & Wiig, What Determines 
Chinese Outward FDI? 33 (CMI, Working Paper No. 3, 2009). For studies of Chinese FDI in Europe, 
see, for example, Carlo Pietrobelli et al., Chinese FDI Strategy in Italy: The ‘Marco Polo’ Effect, 4 
INT’L J. TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING, INNOVATION AND DEV. 277, 281 (2011); Ling Liu & Ying Tian, 
The Internationalisation of Chinese Enterprises: The Analysis of the UK Case, 4 INT’L J. OF TECH. & 
GLOBALISATION 87, 89–90 (2008). 
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Furthermore, U.S. law safeguarding national security from foreign 
investors has evolved in the past three decades and the current CFIUS 
process is a powerful gatekeeper, and remains so in spite of CFIUS’s recent 
unprecedented loss in Ralls.  
The findings of this study also contribute to the nascent debate of state 
capitalism with Chinese characteristics. Despite the relative success of the 
Chinese government in insulating the economy from the global recession, 
the political structure in China and the state-business relationships are such 
that the Chinese model of state capitalism will unlikely constitute a 
formidable challenge to other variants of capitalism in their home fields.266 
Fragmented political power at home constrains the state’s capacity to 
orchestrate long-term industrial and investment policies to be implemented 
by vastly diverse Chinese companies. Its reach is further curtailed beyond 
the state border. As the survey results have shown, when in trouble, Chinese 
investors in the United States show more faith in American lawyers and the 
host government than their purportedly omnipotent and resourceful home 
government.  
The empirical findings of this study have significant policy 
implications as well. Compared to their Japanese counterparts, Chinese 
investors rely more heavily on local employees and professionals, so states 
with high unemployment rates will benefit from investment policies 
targeted at Chinese companies. In addition, the findings of the study about 
the reliance on American service professionals suggest the most effective 
way to regulate Chinese investors is through these intermediaries. The 
regulations should achieve two distinct policy objectives: (1) to ensure the 
professionals will guide Chinese investors in compliance, helping them to 
avoid being misdirected by short-term interests of their clients that 
contradict U.S. law or public policy, and (2) to prevent the professionals 
from abusing the trust and reliance of the Chinese investors. Lack of local 
knowledge renders Chinese investors easy prey of scrupulous service 
providers in the United States. To protect the rights and interests of foreign 
investors and the reputation and integrity of the U.S. market, relevant 
authorities should enhance their law enforcement efforts against 
professionals targeting Chinese clients. Furthermore, faced with the sharp 
rise of Chinese investments, U.S. policymakers should resist the temptation 
to indiscriminately erect legal and regulatory barriers, as they have done 
previously in response to surging FDI from other source countries,267 unless 
doing so is guided by not only unambivalent public policy but also solid 
empirical research.  
Though this study adds a great deal of much-needed empirical 
 
 266 HALL & SOSKICE, supra note 78.  
 267 C. S. Eliot Kang, U.S. Politics and Greater Regulation of Inward Foreign Direct Investment, 51 
INT’L ORG. 301, 301 (1997). 
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evidence to the ongoing debate about China’s business globalization and its 
impact on U.S. institutions, it leaves open several important questions for 
in-depth analysis in the future. Taken as a whole, Chinese investors appear 
adaptive to the host country environment. But significant variations exist 
within this group in terms of the desire and ability to adapt. What factors 
explain such variations? Is the adaptation a function of how long they have 
operated in the U.S. market, differences in ownership structure, investment 
area, or some other unknown variables yet to be explored? Also, the article 
does not explore the exact distribution of investor adaptation among the 
four quadrants in the two-by-two matrix (See Figure 3). Some Chinese 
companies investing in the United States must fall in Quadrants I, II, and 
III, and engage in superficial adaptation or noncompliance with extant U.S. 
institutions. As Chinese investment inflows continue to grow, will more 
join their rank? How can government policies incentivize a migration to 
Quadrant IV? Moreover, as noted earlier, the survey method is not flawless. 
Possible biases may weaken the evidentiary power of the findings. Future 
studies employing multiple empirical methods are welcome to cross-
examine the results and the arguments presented in this article and to test 
alternative theoretical explanations. 
 VIII. CONCLUSION 
Having overtaken Japan to be the second largest economy in the world 
(first if measured by PPP), China is set to surpass the United States in less 
than a decade.268 In addition, the Chinese market is nearing saturation and 
the cost of labor is skyrocketing.269 Meanwhile, the Chinese government is 
actively promoting outbound investment by loosening relevant regulations 
and providing policy and monetary incentives for Chinese firms to “go 
global.”270 All of these factors contribute to the surge of investment 
outflow, making China the third largest source of FDI.271 And the United 
States is quickly emerging as the most favorable destination for Chinese 
investors.272  
The United States has never in its history experienced significant 
investment inflows from a developing country that was not a political ally. 
The potential size of Chinese investment, the distinct features of the 
Chinese economy, and the perceived incompatibility of state capitalism 
with a free market economy easily fuel public fear and academic suspicions, 
potentially causing a major rebalance between the time-honored American 
 
 268 See supra note 1. 
 269 Mitali Das & Papa N’Diaye, The End of Cheap Labor, 50 FIN. & DEV. (June 2013), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/06/das.htm. 
 270 See Si, supra note 21.  
 271 See Sauvant, supra note 24. 
 272 See Shih, supra note 26. 
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tradition of keeping an open economy and the urgent need to safeguard U.S. 
economic and national security. Given the substantial stake, it is imperative 
to get an objective assessment of the “threat” of Chinese investment before 
policymakers and lawmakers adopt major defensive measures. 
Based on the first large-scale survey of Chinese investors in the United 
States, this study finds evidence suggesting that the threat is inflated. 
Despite recent damage to American soft power, Chinese investors generally 
perceive highly U.S. business, legal, and political institutions. Most of the 
investors are commercially-motivated, and are drawn to the United States 
by its market, advanced technology, and brand enhancement value. Unlike 
their Japanese counterparts, the Chinese investors rely heavily on local 
talent. American lawyers, for instance, play an essential role in the 
decisions of their Chinese clients. As a result, the adaptive Chinese 
investors are by and large “playing our game.”  
Also, structural features of Chinese politics determine that its model of 
state capitalism may not constitute a credible long-term threat to the United 
States. And the CFIUS review, established partially in response to the 
perceived threat from Japanese investment in the 1980s and amended over 
time, remain a powerful mechanism for protecting core U.S. interests 
despite the recent setback in Ralls. In addition, to effectively and cost-
efficiently control “rogue” Chinese investors and to protect those in good 
compliance with the U.S. law, relevant authorities should focus on 
supervising the professional intermediaries.  
In retrospect, Japanese FDI in the United States, much feared and 
resented in the 1980s, “increased U.S. competitiveness, employment and 
productivity.”273 Regulated properly, Chinese investors may also become an 
important stakeholder in extant U.S. business, legal, and political 
institutions and a potential contributor to their long-term resilience. 
 
 273 ELWELL ET AL., supra note 17, at 54. 
